

**GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT
YOUTH INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

REPORT OF SPECIAL EVALUATION

November 2011



**CHARLES J. WILLOUGHBY
INSPECTOR GENERAL**

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Office of the Inspector General

Inspector General



November 9, 2011

Via Hand Delivery

Cathy L. Lanier
Chief of Police
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department
300 Indiana Avenue N.W., Room 5080
Washington, D.C. 20001


Dear Chief Lanier:

Enclosed is our *Report of Special Evaluation of the Metropolitan Police Department, Youth Investigations Division* (OIG No. 11-I-0044FA). Written comments from the Metropolitan Police Department on the special evaluation team's 15 findings and 18 recommendations are included in the report. This report will be available publicly at <http://oig.dc.gov>; I encourage you to share it with your employees.

We reviewed your responses to our draft report and have noted in this *final* report that we consider five of our recommendations to be "closed" based on the actions you reported. For the 13 recommendations that remain, we have enclosed *Compliance Forms* on which your staff should record and report to this Office the actions taken on each recommendation. These forms will assist both you and the OIG in tracking compliance with recommendations in the report. Where the form asks for "Agency Action Taken," please report actual completion, in whole or in part, of a recommendation rather than "planned" action. Please ensure that the *Compliance Forms* are returned to the OIG by the response dates noted on the forms.

We appreciate the cooperation shown by you and your employees during the special evaluation and look forward to your continued cooperation during the upcoming follow-up period. If you have questions or comments concerning this report or other matters related to the special evaluation, please contact me or Alvin Wright Jr., Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Evaluations, at (202) 727-2540.

Sincerely,


Charles J. Willoughby
Inspector General

CJW/klb

Enclosure

cc: See **Distribution List**

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Letter to Cathy L. Lanier
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The Inspections and Evaluations (I&E) Division of the Office of the Inspector General is dedicated to providing District of Columbia (D.C.) government decision makers with objective, thorough, and timely evaluations and recommendations that will assist them in achieving efficiency, effectiveness, and economy in operations and programs. I&E goals are to help ensure compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies, identify accountability, recognize excellence, and promote continuous improvement in the delivery of services to D.C. residents and others who have a vested interest in the success of the city.

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**ACRONYMS
AND ABBREVIATIONS**

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS


AHOD	All Hands on Deck
ASP	Armament Systems and Procedures
CART	Child Abduction Response Team
CCN	Central Complaint Number
CFSA	Child and Family Services Agency
CPS	Child Protective Services
CSS	Court Social Services
DYRS	Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services
GAO	U.S. Government Accountability Office (previously known as the General Accounting Office)
ICAC	Internet Crimes Against Children
I&E	Inspections and Evaluations
JCMS	Juvenile Case Management System
JPC	Juvenile Processing Center
MAR	Management Alert Report
MPD	Metropolitan Police Department
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCIC	National Crime Information Center
NCMEC	National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
OC	Oleoresin Capsicum
OCA	Office of the City Administrator
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
PINS	Person in Need of Supervision
RMS	Records Management System

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOW	Statement of Work
USMS	U.S. Marshals Service
WALES	Washington Area Law Enforcement System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
YID	Youth Investigations Division
YSC	Youth Services Center

ORGANIZATION CHART

ORGANIZATION CHART



Source: Based on organization chart provided by YID in July 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview

The Inspections and Evaluations (I&E) Division of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a special evaluation of the Metropolitan Police Department's (MPD) Youth Investigations Division (YID) from July 2009 through September 2010. YID's responsibilities include investigating physical and sexual abuse of children; conducting missing children investigations¹ and Internet crimes against children investigations; and processing juvenile arrestees. YID is part of MPD's Investigative Services Bureau.

Scope and Methodology

The special evaluation objectives were to assess the management and disposition of juvenile missing persons cases at YID's Missing Persons Section and management of the Juvenile Processing Center (JPC),² which is responsible for processing arrested juveniles. The Inspector General directed the evaluation in response to allegations of mismanagement of cases involving missing children and youths, and problems with processing juvenile offenders.

OIG inspections comply with standards established by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and pay particular attention to the quality of internal control.³ The team conducted 56 interviews with 38 MPD employees and 9 observations of key YID processes. In addition, the team conducted a review of 50 randomly selected missing persons case records.

A list of the report's 15 findings and 18 recommendations is included at Appendix 1. The team issued three Management Alert Reports (MARs) during the inspection: 1) MAR 09-I-009 addressed the lack of secure storage of confidential information, including juvenile arrest and child abuse records, as well as building conditions that may pose health hazards; 2) MAR 10-I-001 discussed poor security of members' service weapons at the JPC and inadequate procedures for reporting and investigating missing weapons; and 3) MAR 10-I-003 dealt with deficiencies in training and policies that hinder MPD officers' responses to suspected child abuse and neglect. In addition, the OIG issued a *Compliance Form for Priority Matter* noting that civilian processing technicians' authority to use force on prisoners/detainees was not clearly defined.

¹ These investigations include parental kidnappings, which occur when a parent or other family member takes a child in violation of the custody rights of another family member.

² The JPC is located within the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services' (DYRS) Youth Services Center (YSC) at 1000 Mt. Olivet Rd., N.E., Washington, D.C.

³ "Internal control" is synonymous with "management control" and is defined by the Government Accountability Office as comprising "the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives and, in doing so, supports performance-based management. Internal control also serves as the first line of defense in safeguarding assets and preventing and detecting errors and fraud." STANDARDS FOR INTERNAL CONTROL IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, Introduction at 4 (Nov. 1999).

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Management Alert Reports

Confidential information was not secure, and building conditions may pose health hazards (Page 12). YID maintains investigative case records for child physical and sexual assault cases as well as juvenile arrest records. While touring the YID facility⁴ with a YID manager, an OIG inspector observed more than 75 boxes of physical and sexual abuse case records, 45 boxes of videotaped interviews related to child abuse investigations, and a cabinet with juvenile arrest records that were not secured. The team also found potential health hazards posed by building conditions, including possible asbestos-containing material in poor condition and apparent rodent infestation. These conditions created risks regarding confidentiality, security of evidence, and employee health. MPD's response stated that it would take measures to improve records storage and security, a building inspection had taken place, and work orders were issued to address building conditions.

Law enforcement members' firearms were poorly secured at the Juvenile Processing Center, and MPD had inadequate policies and procedures for reporting and investigating missing weapons (Page 13). Due to the absence of adequate procedures, MPD officers assigned to the JPC are unable to ensure that firearms (i.e., service weapons) brought into the facility by MPD and other law enforcement officers are properly accounted for and secured. Furthermore, JPC detainees are escorted in close proximity to the lock boxes currently used for storing firearms, a practice that could pose safety risks. In addition, MPD's general order pertaining to service weapons lacks explicit, detailed guidance and instructions that an officer and members of his/her command structure should follow in the event that his/her service weapon is lost or stolen. In response to the MAR, MPD described actions it had taken and planned to take to improve lock box security. MPD disagreed with the OIG recommendation to develop explicit written procedures for investigating missing service weapons. The OIG found that existing general orders did not adequately address this concern.

Policy and training deficiencies hindered MPD officers' responses to suspected child abuse and neglect (Page 15). MPD lacked a comprehensive and detailed policy and procedure, as well as adequate training, on recognizing indicators of child abuse and neglect. In addition, there was not an adequate policy or procedure to address reporting these indicators and allegations to the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA). Consequently, there was no way to determine the extent to which MPD patrol officers had the information and skills necessary to recognize and properly report suspected child abuse and neglect. As a result, possible cases of child abuse and neglect may have gone unreported, many of which may warrant investigation and intervention by CFSA to ensure children's safety. In response to the MAR, MPD issued a new general order regarding child abuse and neglect and planned to integrate it into training for new recruits and veteran members.

⁴ The facility is located at 1700 Rhode Island Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Missing Persons Section Findings

Case record review reveals inconsistent and inadequate investigative actions by YID and patrol members on missing persons cases (Page 19). The team reviewed 50 missing persons cases in February 2010 and March 2010. In many of these cases, YID lacked evidence that its detectives took investigative action. More investigative actions were documented by patrol members than by YID detectives. Additionally, some cases did not indicate whether YID had located the juvenile and closed the case. For the cases closed by YID and patrol districts, they rarely interviewed the juveniles to confirm that they had returned and to ascertain why they had been missing. Lastly, the review revealed numerous cases in which the same juveniles repeatedly had run away, and the investigation of these cases consumed a significant amount of MPD resources.

Supervision of the Missing Persons Section has been inadequate (Page 28). The current manager of the Missing Persons Section, who began in March 2009, apprised the OIG of various supervisory techniques that he/she has implemented to ensure quality investigative practices in the section, such as implementing monthly case reviews by managers. However, YID managers had not been conducting routine, formal reviews of juvenile missing persons cases prior to the OIG's review of missing persons cases in February and March 2010, and YID had no written policy regarding case reviews. Additionally, YID's assurance that detectives are conducting investigations is limited to what the detectives document. Interviewees described concerns about limited duty officers, rather than managers, assigning cases to detectives. Without consistent and ongoing supervision, YID lacks assurance that detectives are conducting quality investigations.

Policies and procedures regarding MPD roles and responsibilities for missing persons investigations are unclear (Page 31). Roles and responsibilities of missing persons coordinators in patrol districts, YID, and patrol officers regarding missing persons investigations are not clearly articulated in MPD policies. MPD policy is unclear regarding initiation of YID involvement in juvenile missing persons cases and whether missing persons coordinators or patrol officers are responsible for follow-up on missing persons cases. In addition, there are no written guidelines for YID administrative functions regarding missing persons. Unclear procedures may hinder effective case management and contribute to duplication of effort.

The Missing Persons Section lacks assurance that training is adequate (Page 35). The team received contradictory opinions from missing persons detectives and YID managers regarding whether detectives received adequate training. MPD provided the team with scant information on training courses that detectives had taken. In addition, training is inadequate for limited duty officers performing missing persons administrative functions.

Due to delays in developing a centralized information system, MPD has inefficient processes and inadequate technology for missing persons functions (Page 38). Missing persons functions are over-reliant on paper, and YID tracks missing persons cases in a handwritten log book. MPD also uses duplicative, unreliable computer systems for tracking missing persons cases. Although MPD intends to implement an integrated database called the

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Juvenile Case Management System (JCMS) to improve case management, its implementation has been repeatedly delayed.

The Missing Persons Section has not established performance goals (Page 42). YID does not compare its performance to MPD timeliness standards for missing persons cases. The Missing Persons Section does not have targets to measure its performance against, such as the percent of cases it should close within a certain timeframe or the percent of investigations in which particular actions should be taken.

Inadequate equipment in the Missing Persons Section hinders investigations (Page 44). The Missing Persons Section needs certain equipment to conduct investigations efficiently. Interviewees stated that needed resources include cellular telephones and laptops for detectives, scanners and color printers to make flyers with photographs of missing children, and mug shot retrieval capabilities.

Missing persons cases in patrol districts are not consistently investigated when missing persons coordinators are absent (Page 46). There is inadequate coverage of missing persons cases when MPD district missing persons coordinators are on leave or away from their assigned districts during routine redeployments. Critical non-command post and non-critical juvenile missing persons cases are not investigated when missing persons coordinators are absent. There is no written policy on covering missing persons cases when missing persons coordinators are absent.

Juvenile Processing Center Findings

Summary of Compliance Form for Priority Matter: MPD civilian processing technicians' authority to use force on prisoners/detainees is not clearly defined (Page 50). The JPC staff includes one civilian processing technician. According to a YID manager, the JPC technician has the same responsibilities as an MPD officer assigned to the JPC and may physically subdue combative juveniles as needed. The OIG reviewed applicable criteria pertaining to use of force and concluded that due to a lack of clarity, the legal authority regarding a civilian processing technician's use of force may be reasonably questioned.

The JPC does not adequately track processing times for juveniles and does not process all juveniles timely after arrest (Page 51). MPD has 4 hours to process a prisoner "from the time of arrest until the time the prisoner is ready to be transported to court."⁵ MPD adopted this time standard, otherwise known as the Lively Standard, as part of an agreement to dismiss the lawsuit of *Lively v. Cullinane*. The JPC is not tracking processing times beyond recording in a log book the times juveniles entered and left the JPC, which is inadequate to assess MPD's overall compliance with this standard. Additionally, the team's analysis of data in a JPC log book found instances in which the JPC took more than 4 hours to process juveniles.

Staffing. Early in the fieldwork stage, the team learned that low staffing levels at the JPC created a potentially unsafe work environment. This matter is not a finding in this report because

⁵ MPD Special Order SO-04-05, *The 'Lively Standard'* (Mar. 23, 2004) at 1.

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in October 2009, the team learned that the JPC received five additional officers, which a YID senior official stated is adequate. (See page 50 for further details on this matter.)

Recommendations

The OIG made 18 recommendations to MPD to improve the deficiencies noted and increase operational efficiency. These recommendations include ensuring that juvenile missing persons cases are adequately investigated, investigative activities are properly documented, staffing allocation is assessed, there is consistent supervisory oversight, and juvenile processing times are tracked adequately.

MPD reviewed the draft of this report prior to publication, and its comments in their entirety follow each finding. The OIG requested that MPD note its agreement or disagreement with each of the report's recommendations as well as provide any explanatory comments. MPD provided its written response to the draft report but did not note whether it agreed or disagreed with each of the recommendations.

Note: The OIG does not correct an agency's grammatical or spelling errors, but does format an agency's responses in order to maintain readability of OIG reports. Such formatting is limited to font size, type, and color, with the following exception: if an agency bolds or underlines text within its response, the OIG preserves these elements of format.

Compliance and Follow-Up

The OIG inspection process includes follow-up with MPD on findings and recommendations. Compliance forms with findings and recommendations will be sent to MPD along with this report of special evaluation. I&E will coordinate with MPD on verifying compliance with recommendations over an established period. In some instances, follow-up activities and additional reports may be required.

During their review of the draft report, inspected agencies are given the opportunity to submit any documentation or other evidence to the OIG showing that a problem or issue identified in a finding and recommendation has been resolved or addressed. When such evidence is accepted, the OIG considers that finding and recommendation closed with no further action planned.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Background and Perspective

The Youth Investigations Division (YID) of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) is responsible for investigating child physical and sexual abuse allegations, reports of missing children, and Internet crimes against children, as well as processing juveniles arrested in the District.⁶ YID is part of MPD's Investigative Services Bureau. According to an organization chart provided by YID at the beginning of fieldwork in July 2009, the Missing Persons Section had five detectives. YID additionally had a sergeant and a lieutenant who also oversaw the Internet Crimes Against Children and Human Trafficking Unit. The JPC had 14 officer positions, 3 sergeant positions, 1 lieutenant, and 1 civilian employee.

The special evaluation objectives were to assess the management and disposition of juvenile missing persons cases at YID's Missing Persons Section and management of the Juvenile Processing Center (JPC), which is responsible for processing arrested juveniles. This special evaluation was conducted in response to allegations of mismanagement of cases involving missing children and youths, and problems with processing juvenile offenders.

Overview of MPD Processes for Juvenile Missing Persons Investigations

Juvenile missing persons cases pertain to children under 18 years of age who are missing from their lawful places of abode or are travelling and must be contacted due to an emergency. These cases include runaways, lost children, non-parental kidnappings, and parental kidnappings (which occur when a parent or other family member takes a child in violation of the custody rights of another family member).

MPD classifies juvenile missing persons cases as either critical command post cases, critical non-command post cases, or non-critical cases. Critical cases include those involving a juvenile under 16 years of age, a mentally incapacitated person, a juvenile believed to be in the company of someone who could endanger him/her, or those cases in which it is believed there is real or suspected danger of foul play. Non-critical cases involve juveniles, age 16 and older, where there is no element that poses danger to the juveniles. MPD District Watch Commanders are responsible for determining whether a case is critical or non-critical and establishing a command post⁷ when an immediate search for a critical missing person should be made. In command post missing persons cases, MPD officers, YID detectives, and possibly federal agents are brought to a scene immediately to investigate because the missing person is in danger.

MPD patrol divisions must notify YID immediately of critical command post juvenile missing persons cases so that YID can immediately respond to the scene to provide investigative assistance. YID is to receive open critical non-command post and non-critical juvenile missing persons cases after the MPD districts have had the cases for 30 days. According to a YID monthly activity report, in February 2010, YID received 74 missing persons cases, which

⁶ The JPC is located within the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) Youth Services Center (YSC) at 1000 Mt. Olivet Rd., N.E., Washington, D.C.

⁷ A "command post" is an investigative headquarters set up at the scene of an incident.

INTRODUCTION

included 7 critical command post cases. YID had closed 58 of its missing persons cases during that month.

YID receives documents for missing persons cases closed by the patrol divisions as well as open missing persons cases. YID receives the closed cases because YID is mandated to keep juvenile missing persons records for MPD, maintain comprehensive information on a child's previous history of missing person reports, and quickly access the information for a critical command post case. YID managers explained that cases are closed once a juvenile is located or returns and is not found to be a victim of a crime. According to a YID manager, the Missing Persons Section does not have employees permanently assigned to handle administrative functions. Rather, limited duty officers⁸ are detailed to the Missing Persons Section. They separate open and closed cases, record all received missing persons cases in a log book,⁹ and enter case information into the Approach computer system (a database used by YID to track juvenile missing persons cases). In addition, YID and the patrol divisions use the MPD Missing Persons Database to track missing persons cases. According to a YID manager, YID keeps all juvenile missing persons records for 2 years.

YID detectives investigate missing persons cases by conducting such activities as contacting those who reported juveniles as missing, canvassing the neighborhood, reviewing a missing person's cellular telephone records, talking to friends, and checking Washington Area Law Enforcement System (WALEs)¹⁰ and National Crime Information Center (NCIC) records. According to YID's *Criminal Investigations Manual* and best practices, detectives should interview runaway children after they are located. Missing persons reports and initial investigative activities must be documented on PD Form 251 (Appendix 3). Subsequent investigation activities and case closure activities must be documented on PD Form 252 (Appendix 3). After signing the PD Forms 251 and 252, MPD officers then submit the forms to a supervisor for review. MPD's Records Management System (RMS) is a paperless reporting system used to record various police activities documented on PD Forms 251 and 252.

The team reviewed best practices for investigating juvenile missing person cases from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC is a private, nonprofit organization that provides resources, training, and education to law enforcement to aid in investigating cases of missing and sexually exploited children. According to a YID manager, NCMEC has trained YID missing persons detectives.

Overview of Juvenile Processing Center (JPC) Responsibilities

After juveniles are taken into police custody, officers transport them to the JPC for processing and criminal background checks. Processing at the JPC includes searching, photographing, and fingerprinting juveniles; a criminal record check; and a health screening to identify any medical issues. A JPC employee records information into a log book, including the

⁸ "Limited duty officers" are those who are unable to perform their full range of duties due to injury or other temporary medical disability but are capable of performing certain types of work.

⁹ Information in the log book includes the child's name, date of birth, MPD Central Complaint Number (CCN), and date received by YID.

¹⁰ WALEs contains law enforcement information for the District, Maryland, and Virginia.

INTRODUCTION

name of the juvenile, time of entry into the JPC, and time of departure from the JPC. For serious or violent offenses, juveniles are taken first to the YID building for interviews. Other local police departments, such as the U.S. Capitol Police and Park Police, also bring juveniles arrested in the District to the JPC.

The JPC checks MPD records, WALES, and NCIC records to determine if a juvenile should be diverted or processed for court. Juveniles without prior police records who have been detained for certain misdemeanors may be diverted into a community-based program. In these cases, the juveniles are released to their parents or caretakers and will not have arrest records if they successfully complete the diversion program. In addition, MPD may release a juvenile to a parent or caretaker without filing charges. For those not released or diverted, the JPC books juveniles by entering their information into a computer system, and then transports them to court. If court is not in session, the JPC transfers juveniles to DYRS' youth services area within the YSC building for an interview with a court services officer, who makes a release determination.

**SUMMARIES OF
MANAGEMENT ALERT REPORTS**

SUMMARIES OF MANAGEMENT ALERT REPORTS

1. Confidential information is not secure, and building conditions may pose health hazards.

D.C. Code § 16-2333(a) (2001) states, “Law enforcement records and files concerning a child shall not be open to public inspection nor shall their contents or existence be disclosed to the public”¹¹ According to MPD’s General Order *Preservation of Potentially Discoverable Material* (GO-SPT-601.02), MPD “is to preserve all material, which may constitute evidence, or may otherwise be pertinent in a subsequent criminal judicial proceeding.” This General Order provides that potentially discoverable material includes reports, documents, and videotapes and shall be maintained in secure file cabinets.¹²

The OIG observed more than 75 boxes of physical and sexual abuse case records in an unlocked, unattended room while touring the facility¹³ with a YID manager.¹⁴ In addition, more than 45 boxes of videotapes, reportedly pertaining to abuse investigations, were observed in an unlocked room and hallway in the basement. Although the videotapes pertained to closed cases, the manager stated that they might contain interviews with victims and suspects and may be needed as evidence if there is another case involving the same family. The OIG also found that some juvenile missing persons case records that YID prepared for archiving did not have adequate documentation showing that they had been properly closed.

Conditions in the YID building may pose health hazards. An OIG inspector observed materials, such as floor tiles broken into small pieces and degraded pipe insulation that may contain asbestos, in the basement of YID that included a locker room, an office area, and a storage area. The OIG also found what appeared to be rodent droppings in a closet on the third floor.

On September 30, 2009, the OIG issued MAR 09-I-009 to the Chief of Police regarding insecure storage of confidential records and potentially hazardous building conditions. On October 16, 2009, MPD responded to the MAR and stated that it was in the process of storing records electronically, transferring hard copies off-site, and would take measures to secure areas where files are stored. MPD also replied that YID was in the process of reviewing closed juvenile missing persons case records. According to MPD, a building inspection was conducted on October 5, 2009, and work orders were issued to test for asbestos, resolve water leaks, and provide pest control. The complete MAR and its recommendations, as well as MPD’s response, may be accessed at the OIG’s website.¹⁵

¹¹ According to D.C. Code § 16-2301(3), a “child” is a person under the age of 18.

¹² A YID manager stated that files for physical and sexual abuse cases contain potentially discoverable material, and that investigative records for missing persons cases that involve criminal activity also include discoverable material.

¹³ The facility is located at 1700 Rhode Island Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C.

¹⁴ The inspector relied on YID staff to determine whether records were related to child abuse cases and juvenile arrests because, due to privacy laws, the OIG does not have access to these records.

¹⁵ See <http://oig.dc.gov>, and click on Inspection and Evaluation reports to find the September 30, 2009, MAR.

SUMMARIES OF MANAGEMENT ALERT REPORTS

MPD's September 2011 Response, as Received:

- *Security Measures: Seventy-five boxes of physical and sexual abuse case records, forty-five boxes of videotaped interviews regarding child abuse investigations, and a cabinet with juvenile records have been secured in locked storage areas (Rooms B05 and B06).*
- *Health Hazards: The Department of Real Estate Services (DRES) treated the building for rodent infestation and currently has contractors on site to complete asbestos removal on the second floor and the installation of new floor tile for multiple rooms (208, 209, 210 and 211). The remaining carpeted areas have not been designated for removal.*

2. Law enforcement members' firearms are poorly secured at the Juvenile Processing Center, and MPD has inadequate policies and procedures for reporting and investigating missing weapons.

MPD officers, DYRS staff, and officers from other area police departments (such as the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority) transport juvenile detainees in and out of the JPC via a van port, which is a secure, garage-like space in DYRS' YSC building. Before entering the JPC, officers must secure their firearms in lock boxes¹⁶ that are affixed to a wall of the van port and adjacent to a door that leads into the JPC and DYRS areas. The van port has a vehicle entry door, a vehicle exit door, and two pedestrian doors, all of which open to a parking lot area that is not fenced in.

In September and early November 2009, MPD interviewees stated that there were not enough keys for the JPC lock boxes, leading officers to sometimes place multiple firearms in one lock box. Although the number of functional lock boxes was increased, the JPC lacked adequate procedures, such as use of a log book to record lock box assignments, to ensure accountability for lock box keys and security of the weapons stored in them. The OIG was also concerned that the location of the JPC lock boxes in the van port may not be the most secure location to ensure that service weapons are not stolen because officers lead juvenile detainees, albeit handcuffed, through the van port in close proximity to the lock boxes. In addition, one of the JPC van port doors did not always close promptly.

The OIG learned that a JPC officer discovered on November 10, 2009, that his/her firearm was missing from a JPC lock box. Interviewees stated that they assumed another MPD officer mistakenly took it because an MPD firearm was left in another JPC lock box. An interviewee speculated that a key that opened more than one lock box allowed an officer to take the wrong firearm. A YID manager stated that the two firearms were returned to the correct

¹⁶ The lock boxes at the JPC are small metal lockers opened with keys that law enforcement officers use to secure their weapons. The lock boxes are secured to the wall. According to MPD Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Holding Facilities, effective May 30, 2003, an MPD member transporting a prisoner shall "[s]ecure his/her service weapon in a compartment specifically designated for securing weapons, PRIOR TO entering the cell block/holding area[.]" (Emphasis in the original.)

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officers 2 days after the incident occurred. This manager opined that the YID watch commander should have been notified about the missing weapon immediately, which would have led to a more rapid resolution. The OIG reviewed the procedure for reporting lost, damaged, or stolen firearms contained in General Order GO-RAR-901.01 entitled *Handling of Service Weapons*. It lacked specifics, such as when supervisors should complete investigations of missing or stolen weapons and whether provisions for lost or stolen service weapons apply to incidents in which officers are presumed to have inadvertently exchanged weapons.

On January 21, 2010, the OIG issued MAR 10-I-001 to the Chief of Police regarding weapons security issues. MPD responded on February 17, 2010, and provided a supplemental response on March 31, 2010. MPD provided updates on actions it had taken or planned to take regarding some of the recommendations, but cited various existing procedures as addressing investigations of missing service weapons. The OIG found that MPD's general order pertaining to the handling of service weapons and other general orders cited by MPD in its response lacked explicit, detailed guidance and instructions that an officer and members of his/her command structure should follow in the event that his/her service weapon is lost or stolen. MPD also stated that maintaining a log book for the issuance of lock box keys was not practical. Lastly, MPD reported that it evaluated the lock boxes in all its facilities and found that five facilities had inoperable lock boxes due to missing keys, and MPD planned to order replacement lock boxes, parts, and keys.

In February 2011, a YID senior official updated the team that the JPC received new lock boxes with keys and that officers use a log book to show which lock box and key each officer is using.

The complete MAR and its recommendations, as well MPD's responses, may be accessed at the OIG's website.¹⁷

MPD's September 2011 Response, as Received:

- *Poorly Secured Firearm: In February 2011, a YID senior official updated the OIG team that the JPC received new weapon lock boxes with keys and that officers use a log book to identify which lock box and key each officer is using.*
- *Inadequate Procedures for Reporting/Investigating Firearms: In my letter of response dated February 10, 2011, General Order 110.11 (Uniform and Equipment), part IV, A, 16, D, stated in part: "Member reporting the loss of identifiable Department property (items marked with identifying numbers, e.g., badge, pistol, identification card, etc.) or reporting the loss of property as a result of a criminal offense, shall in addition to the PD 43, prepare a PD Form 251 (Event Report).*

General Order 120.21 (Disciplinary Procedures and Processes) also provides policy, rules, regulations, procedural guidelines, table of offenses and penalties for Loss of Firearm...and other Department issued equipment.

¹⁷ See <http://oig.dc.gov>, and click on Inspection and Evaluation reports to find the January 21, 2010, MAR.

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Teletype # 04-001-11 dated April 1, 2011; also provides new procedures for obtaining (IS) numbers from the Internal Affairs Division to track all investigations.

3. Policy and training deficiencies hinder MPD officers' responses to suspected child abuse and neglect.

D.C. Code § 4-1321.02 (2008) states that persons in certain occupations, such as law enforcement officers, are mandated reporters who must report suspected child abuse or neglect to CFSA or MPD. CFSA's Child Protective Services (CPS) receives, reviews, and screens reports of alleged or suspected child abuse and neglect through its Hotline to determine which reports require an investigation by CPS. According to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between MPD and CFSA, MPD is to "refer" reports of intra-familial child maltreatment¹⁸ to the CFSA Hotline, including those from calls directly received by MPD.¹⁹

The OIG found that MPD officers lack a comprehensive and detailed policy and procedure to guide them in recognizing indicators of child abuse and neglect. In addition, there is not an adequate policy or procedure to address reporting these indicators and allegations of child abuse and neglect to CFSA. Although several MPD policies contained limited information on child abuse and neglect, they did not include legal definitions, indicators of abuse and neglect, instructions on how to document suspected child abuse and neglect, or a requirement that officers notify CFSA. Two MPD managers stated that MPD officers are not knowledgeable about reporting certain types of suspected neglect to CFSA. These managers also stated that MPD officers need additional training on the proper response to suspected child abuse and neglect, including appropriate reporting of these incidents, and instruction on legally permissible types of corporal punishment in the District of Columbia. MPD members were required to complete a CFSA online training course for mandated reporters on child abuse and neglect, but it did not address MPD officers' unique duties and responsibilities. The OIG received conflicting information from CFSA and MPD regarding the number of MPD employees who had taken this course. As a result of deficiencies in training and procedures, possible cases of child abuse and neglect may go unreported, many of which may warrant investigation and intervention by CFSA to ensure children's safety.

On June 30, 2010, the OIG issued MAR 10-I-003 to MPD and CFSA. MPD responded on August 4, 2010, and stated that it planned to issue a single directive on child abuse and neglect in September 2010 and integrate it into training for new recruits and veteran members. MPD also indicated it was working with CFSA to reconcile training completion rosters. CFSA informed the OIG that it collaborated on MPD's response and would not respond separately.

¹⁸ The MOU defines "maltreatment" as "harm to a child that is either physically and/or sexually inflicted; the harm may also include neglect." District of Columbia Memorandum of Understanding and Inter-Agency Agreement on Child Maltreatment Joint Investigations 3 (Oct. 8, 2003).

¹⁹ This MOU adds that MPD has primary responsibility for the investigation of sexual abuse and serious physical abuse cases, and the YID investigator for the case is to contact CFSA to arrange for a joint investigation prior to responding to the case. CFSA has primary responsibility for other abuse cases and for neglect cases. *Id.* at 6 and 9.

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In October 2010, the Inspector General issued a letter to MPD's Chief of Police requesting an update of its actions taken to address the MAR. The Chief responded in November 2010 with a copy of its recently issued General Order 309.06 covering departmental policies dealing with child abuse and neglect, which was effective November 18, 2010. The Chief added that MPD continues to work closely with CFSA on training related matters. The complete MAR and its recommendations, as well MPD's response, may be accessed at the OIG's website.²⁰

New Recommendation:

That the Chief of Police update the Inspector General on MPD's efforts to work with CFSA to:

- a. develop additional training for all affected MPD members (beyond CFSA's online mandated reporter training) to ensure that officers understand their specific responsibility to recognize, respond to, and report suspected child abuse and neglect;
- b. receive accurate information regarding which MPD officers have completed CFSA online training for mandated reporters; and
- c. provide the Inspector General with the current percentage of MPD employees who have taken CFSA's online training for mandated reporters.

MPD's September 2011 Response, as Received:

- *Policy and Training Deviancies Hindrance: On November 10, 2010, I provided the OIG team with a copy of General Order 309.6 covering Department policies dealing with Child Neglect and Abuse, which took effect November 18, 2010.*

MPD will further update the Inspector General of the below:

- a. *Efforts to work with CFSA on developing additional training for all affected MPD members (beyond CFSA's online mandated reporter training) to ensure that officers understand their specific responsibility to recognize, respond to, and report suspected child abuse and neglect.*
- b. *Accurate information regarding which MPD Officers have completed CFSA online training for mandated reporters and a current percentage of MPD employees who have taken CFSA's online training for mandated reporters.*

OIG Comment: **The OIG is concerned that MPD did not provide an update on (1) its efforts to work with CFSA on developing additional training for all affected MPD members regarding suspected child abuse and neglect, or (2) the percentage of MPD employees who**

²⁰ See <http://oig.dc.gov>, and click on Inspection and Evaluation reports to find the June 30, 2010, MAR.

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have completed CFSA's online training for mandated reporters. The OIG issued this MAR with similar recommendations more than a year ago.²¹

²¹ In the MAR, the OIG recommended that MPD collaborate with CFSA to gather accurate information regarding its members completion of CFSA's online training. After receiving MPD's response to the MAR, the Inspector General issued a letter in October 2010 to MPD officially requesting an update on its reconciliation of the number of MPD members who have received this training.

MISSING PERSONS SECTION

MISSING PERSONS SECTION

1. Case record review reveals inconsistent and inadequate investigative actions by YID and patrol members on missing persons cases.

Methodology

In February and March 2010, the team reviewed documents from a sample of juvenile missing persons cases open at YID for investigation as well as juvenile missing persons cases that patrol members closed. The review's purpose was to examine whether initial incident reports were developed, whether missing juveniles were found, and whether closure was documented appropriately, as well as the extent of investigative efforts. The team reviewed cases that YID had received that were classified as closed by patrol districts (patrol) to determine whether these cases were actually closed.

The team received a universe of 389 juvenile missing persons cases given to YID in August 2009 according to YID's missing persons log book. Of these, 322 (83%) were closed patrol cases and 67 (17%) were open cases from patrol that were assigned to YID detectives. From each of these two populations, the team selected a random sample of 25 closed cases and 25 open cases. Neither of these samples is a statistically representative sample and the results cannot be extrapolated to the entire population of cases. However, the team's review of these randomly selected cases found deficiencies that MPD managers should consider in order to improve missing persons investigations.

The team developed two instruments for the case record review—one for closed cases and another for open cases. Many questions were based on criteria in MPD/YID policies. The team piloted²² the instruments and made necessary changes to the instruments.²³

a. YID lacks evidence that its detectives investigate missing persons cases.

The OIG's case review revealed that 12 (48%) of 25 open cases assigned to YID did not have documentation that YID conducted any investigative activities. For the remaining 13 cases, there were only 15 documented instances of YID's investigative effort to locate the missing juveniles (see Table 1 on the following page). In contrast, there were 192 documented occurrences of investigative activity performed by patrol in these same 25 cases.²⁴ The team assessed various types of investigative effort, such as attempting to contact or successfully reaching the family or school and checking hospitals to locate the missing juvenile. These 25 open cases were assigned to 4 YID detectives. Each of these detectives had at least one case without evidence of documented investigative efforts, indicating that this problem was not

²² "Piloting" the case review instrument refers to pre-testing it to identify if the proposed methods or instruments are inappropriate or too complicated. See <http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU35.html>.

²³ The team requested that YID ensure that protected information, such as child abuse investigation records and juvenile arrest records, was not in the records reviewed by the team.

²⁴ Prior to transferring these cases to YID, patrol had these cases from 0 to 30 days, with a median of 6.5 days. YID had possession of these cases (based on the date of receipt reflected in the YID log book up until the date YID closed the case or the date of the OIG's review, whichever is earlier) from 0 to 213 days, with a median of 13.5 days. The team excluded one case from this analysis because we had not recorded the date MPD received notice that the juvenile was missing.

MISSING PERSONS SECTION

confined to one or two detectives. Of the 12 cases without any evidence of YID investigative effort, 6 were assigned to one detective, 3 to a second detective, 2 to a third detective, and 1 to a fourth detective.

Table 1. Patrol and YID Investigative Efforts in Open Missing Persons Cases Assigned to YID

Type of Contact	Patrol Division		YID	
	Number of Sampled Cases With Documented Contacts (n=25)	Total Number of Documented Contacts in Case Sample	Number of Sampled Cases With Documented Contacts (n=25)	Total Number of Documented Contacts in Case Sample
Face-to-face or telephone call to family or residence	9	18	11	12
Face-to-face visit or called school	0	0	1	1
Face-to-face visit or called friend or relative	1	2	0	0
Checked hospitals (telephone call or face-to-face)	21	87	0	0
Checked with Juvenile Processing Center or checked in the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) ²⁵ to determine if child had been arrested	18	24	0	0
Contacted National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC)	0	0	0	0
Contacted other jurisdictions	0	0	0	0
Checked WALES/NCIC	18	24	2	2
Other contacts	21	37	0	0
Totals²⁶	25	192	13	15

Some interviewees explained that detectives carried a high caseload. However, a YID manager stated in May 2010 that YID detectives had an average of 20 cases each. Consequently, in light of the low number of documented investigative activities conducted by YID detectives, the OIG questions whether YID detectives' efforts are sufficient to solve its missing persons cases and whether YID can decrease the number of missing persons detectives from the five

²⁵ CJIS is a computerized booking system that contains arrest information for the District of Columbia.

²⁶ The total figures for the number of cases represent those cases with at least one investigative activity noted.

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
currently assigned.

b. Some missing persons cases did not reflect whether the juvenile had been located by YID or patrol.

According to MPD General Order GO-OPS-304.03 entitled *Missing Person Reports*, “A separate PD Form 252 shall be submitted whenever additional information is received **or when a missing person is located and the missing person case is closed.**” *Id.* § IV.F.3 (emphasis in the original). MPD Special Order SO-08-02 states that a supervisor shall “[a]cknowledge receipt and review of reports by affixing his/her legible signature to the original reports after they have been properly completed”²⁷

Results of Cases Transferred From Patrol to YID as Open

Chart 1 below shows the status of the open cases assigned to YID. Of the 25 open cases, 5 (20%) contained neither case closure documentation nor evidence of any YID investigative activity.²⁸ Our review of the cases occurred in March 2010, more than 6 months after the cases were assigned to YID.



As the team found no evidence of closure for these five cases, the team requested information on their status. Subsequently, YID updated the team on these cases. While YID was eventually able to provide the OIG with closure information for these cases, the OIG is concerned that evidence of case closure and juvenile location was not present at the time of the team’s case record review, more than 6 months after patrol transferred the cases to YID in August 2009. YID personnel assigned four of these cases to one detective, and one case to a second. Details of these cases follow:

²⁷ MPD Special Order SO-08-02, *Duties and Responsibilities for Reviewing PD Forms 251, 252, and PD Forms 10s for Accuracy, Completeness, and CCN Reconciliation*, (Apr. 11, 2008). § III.A.4.

²⁸ Three of these cases without documentation of closure were listed as open in YID’s Approach database. Another did not have any investigative documents and was not listed in Approach. According to YID managers, at the time of the review, PD Form 252s were not available in RMS.

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- A 14 year-old was reported missing in July 2009. A patrol officer contacted the juvenile's mother in August and September 2009, and she stated that she had not heard from the missing juvenile. YID did not document any investigative actions, and the case was listed as open in YID's Approach database. After the team brought this to the attention of a YID manager, YID personnel were unable to find the necessary supporting documents of case closure. Therefore, YID conducted follow-up activity and closed the case via a PD Form 252 in July 2010. The form stated that the child returned home in July 2010 and the detective interviewed the juvenile, who stated that he/she had been staying with his/her father.
- A 16 year-old was reported missing to MPD in July 2009. The team did not find any documented YID investigative actions and informed a YID manager. In response, the manager stated that he/she had spoken with the assigned detective, who had no explanation for not having closure documents, and indicated that he/she would instruct the detective to go out on this case immediately. Afterward, the detective closed the case with a PD Form 252 in April 2010. The narrative on the form stated that a source reported that the missing child had returned in August 2009, the original PD Form 252 could not be found, and the detective interviewed the juvenile in April 2010.
- A 17 year-old was reported missing in August 2009. A relative reported that the juvenile and his/her mother went to a bus station in the District to return home to another state. The juvenile went in the restroom in the station but did not return. The mother boarded a bus without the juvenile. Patrol documented various investigative actions, including searching for the juvenile at the bus station. However, YID did not document any investigative actions, and the case was listed as open in YID's Approach database. A YID manager followed up with the detective assigned to this case and provided the team a PD Form 252 that documented case closure in September 2009. It reflected that the detective spoke with the source, who stated that the missing juvenile had gone to a different state and returned in August 2009; however, the PD Form 252 did not reflect that the detective spoke with the juvenile. Further, this form reflected the sergeant's signature but not the detective's.
- A 20 year-old²⁹ went missing in July 2009. This case was not in YID's Approach database, and there were no documents for this incident at the time of the team's review. After the team brought the matter to a YID manager, who followed up with the detective, the team received a copy of the PD Form 252 closing the case in March 2010, after the team's review. The PD Form 252 reflected that the detective interviewed the 20 year-old.
- A 17 year-old went missing in August 2009. There were no closing documents or evidence of any YID investigative action in the case record. After the review, the team received a copy of a PD Form 252 when this juvenile was located in October

²⁹ According to a YID manager, YID investigates cases of missing 18 to 21 year-olds if they are wards of the state. It was unclear to the team whether the missing person in this case was a ward of the District.


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2009 during a subsequent missing persons incident.

Twenty cases sent by patrol to YID as open had closure documents at the time of the OIG review. Of these, 15 (75%) reflected a supervisor's signature for case closure. In addition, of the 20 cases with closure documents, the most common reasons for case closure were that the juvenile had returned on his/her own (11) or another law enforcement agency had located the juvenile (5).

Results of Cases Closed by Patrol

Of the 25 cases closed by patrol, 13 cases contained a PD Form 252 documenting closure, 9 cases contained other documentation of closure, such as a UN-411 "Missing Person Located" sheet, and 3 cases did not contain closure documents (see Chart 2 below).



For two of the three cases without closure documents, each PD Form 251 noted that the case was "closed," but did not reflect whether the juvenile had been located. The third case had no documents for this incident, including evidence of closure. The team questions why patrol sent this case to YID as closed. A YID manager informed the team that YID does not check cases closed by patrol to ensure that all relevant information is submitted because patrol supervisors are responsible for checking that forms are properly completed.

Of the 24 cases with documentation reflecting that the case was closed by patrol,³⁰ 13 (54%) of these had closure documents with an MPD sergeant's or other official's signature. Twenty-one (88%) of these 24 cases reflected that the child was located or had returned.

c. Patrol and YID rarely interview juveniles once they return.

YID's *Criminal Investigations Manual* for missing persons states, "Running away from home is, for many children, a symptom of more serious family problems[.]" and that runaways should be interviewed to determine why they ran away and what happened to them. This enables

³⁰ This includes two cases that only had a PD Form 251 stating they were "closed."

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MPD to ascertain whether abuse or neglect led them to leave.³¹ NCMEC recommends that officers thoroughly interview runaway children and document the results of these interviews.³² This should include determining why the child left, where he/she went and stayed, and whether it is safe for the child to return home. A YID manager stated that in order to close a missing persons case when the juvenile is located, a YID detective or other MPD officer is to interview the juvenile to ensure that he/she is not a victim of a crime and is of sound mind and body.

The team determined whether an MPD member interviewed, saw, or spoke with juveniles who were located.³³ For the 20 open cases at YID with documentation of closure:

- 2 cases (10%) reflected that an MPD member interviewed the juvenile in person;
- 16 cases (80%) did not reflect that an MPD member saw or spoke with the juvenile; and
- 2 cases (10%) were not applicable as the child was found by or in the custody of a law enforcement agency in another jurisdiction.

Of the 25 cases closed by patrol, there was evidence that only one juvenile was interviewed by MPD.

Additional Issues

The OIG case review shows additional issues with completion of required MPD initial incident reports as well as with repeat runaways.

Completion of Initial Incident Reports. According to MPD General Order GO-OPS-304.03, entitled *Missing Person Reports*, effective January 30, 2004, an MPD member handling a juvenile missing person case must document initial efforts to locate the child on a PD Form 251, which is to be forwarded to YID.³⁴ Twenty-four (96%) of 25 open cases assigned to YID detectives had either an electronic or hard copy PD Form 251 (initial incident report)³⁵ and 21 cases (84%) of the 25 cases closed by patrol had either an electronic or hard copy PD Form 251³⁶ (see Charts 3 and 4 on the following page).

³¹ METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 312 (2002).

³² NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN: A LAW-ENFORCEMENT GUIDE TO CASE INVESTIGATION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 121 (2006).



³³ The OIG team did not assess whether these juveniles were missing because they ran away.

³⁴ *Id.* Sections IV.E.1.c and f.

³⁵ Seven of the PD Form 251s were not found in the case record but were reflected in MPD's electronic Records Management System (RMS).

³⁶ Ten of the PD Form 251s were not in the case record but were available in RMS.

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Repeat runaways. While the team did not examine the number of missing incidents for all cases, it noted that some juveniles had numerous missing persons reports, as shown in Table 2 below.³⁷

Table 2: Juveniles With Numerous Missing Persons Reports

	Number of Unique Missing Persons Reports	Timeframe for Reports
Juvenile 1	39	March 2009-December 2009
Juvenile 2	22	May 2009-November 2009
Juvenile 3	24	January 2009-November 2009
Juvenile 4	22	January 2009-November 2009

According to MPD General Order GO-OPS-304.03, entitled *Missing Person Reports*, effective January 30, 2004, “A report shall be made for each instance of a missing person case, regardless of the event location (e.g., group home or private home). A missing person report shall be taken whenever a juvenile is reported missing from a group home.”³⁸ This general order also states that YID is to “[c]onduct and report on a PD Form 252, the follow-up investigation of all juvenile missing persons—those under 18 years of age and those reported missing from group homes”³⁹ This general order does not allow MPD discretion to evaluate a juvenile’s past pattern of curfew violations to determine when to initiate a missing persons investigation.

Interviewees stated that juveniles from group homes generate a significant number of repeat missing persons reports. One MPD senior official estimated that about 80% of missing persons cases involve juveniles from group homes—which include those under CFSA, Court Social Services (CSS), and DYRS oversight—and many are operated by nonprofit organizations.

³⁷ In some instances, more than one report was filed on 1 day. As the team was not reviewing reports outside of the sampled investigations, the team was uncertain why this occurred. We counted each unique report as a separate report.

³⁸ *Id.* Section IV.E.

³⁹ *Id.* Section IV.O.

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This senior official stated that many missing persons cases involve juveniles who are just hanging out and do not want to obey their curfews and that a very low percentage of these cases involve the possibility of foul play.

The OIG is concerned that repeat runaway incidents appear to expend a significant amount of MPD resources as MPD is required to investigate every juvenile missing person case. An MPD senior official explained that repeat runaways from group homes require MPD to spend an inordinate amount of time taking reports and responding to calls for assistance. According to NCMEC, “[F]ewer runaway reports result in a decreased caseload. More importantly[,] incident reduction results in fewer children being subjected to victimization and exploitation.”⁴⁰

Conclusion: Inadequate Investigative Practices in Missing Persons Cases

Prior to conducting the case review, the team interviewed YID managers about their concerns with the operations of the Missing Persons Section. In August 2009, a YID senior official stated that upon taking his/her position in early 2009, he/she found that the unit was not functioning properly and made some management changes. While there had been many improvements, further work was needed. For instance, detectives were being assigned closed cases, which gave the appearance of high caseloads, but all they actually needed to do was file these cases. A YID manager expressed concerns with the backlog of investigations, how they were managed in the computer systems, the assignment of open and closed cases to detectives, the lack of follow-up activities in some investigations, and that investigations were not being returned to supervisors for review.

After the team initiated its case review and inquired about cases that lacked investigative activity, a YID manager informed the team that he/she implemented a monthly case review process in the missing persons section in March 2010. (See Finding 2 for further information.) After the team concluded its review, we followed up with this manager about how the detectives spent their time as we observed many cases without investigative action. He/she stated that the majority of the detectives probably spent their time following up on cases and clearing backlogs of old cases. This individual also expressed concerns with how detectives spent their time but did not elaborate. Without an adequate case monitoring process already in existence, the OIG is concerned that the lack of investigative action at YID as identified during our case review may have been a common practice among missing persons detectives that was not identified and/or addressed appropriately by YID managers.

Recommendations:

- (1) That the Chief of Police ensure that juvenile missing persons cases are adequately investigated and that investigative activities are properly documented on PD Forms 251 and 252 by YID and patrol.
- (2) That the Chief of Police analyze the workload and staffing of the Missing Persons

⁴⁰ NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, MISSING AND ABDUCTED CHILDREN: A LAW-ENFORCEMENT GUIDE TO CASE INVESTIGATION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 122 (2006).

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Section and, if needed, implement changes to maximize efficient use of MPD staff.

- (3) That the Chief of Police ensure that MPD members confirm the return of juvenile missing persons by interviewing these juveniles when they return or are located.

OIG Comment: **Based on MPD’s responses, the OIG found that MPD partially met the intent of these recommendations. Specifically, MPD stated that, “General Order 304.3, (Missing Person Reports), dated August 22, 2011, updated all policies, regulations and procedures for reporting, documenting (a. PD Form 251 & 252, running resumes) and investigating cases (b. reflect whether the juvenile has been located by YID or patrol and c. interview juvenile upon return and determine if located).”**

The OIG obtained and reviewed MPD General Order GO-OPS-304.03, entitled Missing Person Reports, effective August 22, 2011. This general order outlines various responsibilities of the YID Commanding Official to ensure that investigative activities occur on missing persons cases. For example, it requires this official to ensure that required follow-up occurs, required reports are prepared, and YID members respond immediately to the scene of command post cases for critical missing juveniles. However, the order does not outline supervisory protocols that missing persons managers should execute to ensure these actions occur. Based on the results of the OIG’s case review of YID actions on missing persons cases, the OIG encourages YID to consistently apply various supervisory techniques, such as routine case reviews, to ensure that YID personnel comply with MPD requirements in missing persons cases.

Secondly, although MPD did not specify in its response to this finding that it had analyzed the workload and staffing of the Missing Persons Section, its response to a subsequent finding stated that missing persons coordinators from Patrol Divisions have been reallocated to YID. The OIG encourages MPD to periodically assess the workload and staffing for missing persons functions and make changes as needed.

Lastly, this general order does not specify that MPD members are to interview juveniles, either in person or via telephone, when they return or are located. It states: “Members who find a juvenile missing person where there is suspected child neglect or abuse shall complete a PD Form 252 and notify YID and CFSA.”⁴¹ It also states that members are to report on PD Form 252s the whereabouts of the missing person during his/her absence, if determined, and the condition of the missing person.⁴² While it may imply that a juvenile is to be interviewed when located in order to obtain this information, it does not specify this. As a result, MPD members may rely on gathering this information from other sources. During its case review, the OIG found that only a few missing persons cases reflected evidence that the juvenile was interviewed after being located.

⁴¹ *Id.* Section V.G.1.

⁴² *Id.* Section V.G.4.

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2. **Supervision of the Missing Persons Section has been inadequate.**

Criteria:⁴³ The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommends:

Employees are provided a proper amount of supervision. Consider the following:

- Employees receive guidance, review, and on-the-job training from supervisors to help ensure proper work flow and processing of transactions and events, reduce misunderstandings, and discourage wrongful acts.
- Supervisory personnel ensure that staff are aware of their duties and responsibilities and management's expectations.⁴⁴

YID's *Criminal Investigations Manual* states, "Because he or she is responsible for securing the resources needed to work a case and overseeing the investigating officers, the supervising officer must remain informed of all developments in any missing child case."⁴⁵ The supervisor must also ensure that "investigating officers comply with applicable policies and procedures."⁴⁶

According to a publication from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, "[F]irst-line supervisors should be in the field as often as possible, rather than being in the office. Not only does the supervisor provide an additional police presence, but this is also the best way to observe the performance of subordinates."⁴⁷

Condition:⁴⁸ Through observations and interviews, the team identified areas where supervision has been inadequate or lacking in the Missing Persons Section. While the current manager of the Missing Persons Section, who began in March 2009, has implemented several supervisory controls, additional areas for improvement remain. A YID senior official stated that the Missing Persons Section has improved under its current manager. He/she stated that due to this manager's supervision, there is more consistency in procedures and documentation as well as increased monitoring.

⁴³ "Criteria" are the rules that govern the activity evaluated. Examples of criteria include internal policies and procedures, District and/or federal regulations and laws, and best practices.

⁴⁴ GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL CONTROL MANAGEMENT AND EVALUATION TOOL, GAO-01-1008G 19 (Aug. 2001).

⁴⁵ METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, 310 (Jan. 2002).

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ Bill Sullivan, Chief of Police, Oakdale, Minnesota. "Police Supervision in the 21st Century: Can Traditional Work Standards and the Contemporary Employee Coexist?" THE POLICE CHIEF: THE PROFESSIONAL VOICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print_display&article_id=1391&issue_id=102004 (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).

⁴⁸ The "condition" is the problem, issue, or status of the activity evaluated.

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A YID manager stated that reviews of missing persons cases had not been conducted prior to the OIG's review that began in February 2010. The manager added that YID implemented monthly case reviews in March 2010. He/she explained that the purpose of the case reviews is to ensure that detectives pursue leads and to provide guidance to detectives to help them close cases faster. The managers ensure that detectives have worked on their assigned cases for the month and adequately documented them. Managers also make recommendations for improvement. The manager added that these reviews have been helpful in ensuring that each detective works on each case, and the detectives are aware of what is expected of them. In addition, case review results lay the groundwork for any future disciplinary action. The manager stated that the Missing Persons Section did not have a checklist for documenting the results of the management reviews of missing persons cases. Currently, managers document notes from the review of a particular case on a printout from Approach about that case.

According to a manager, YID does not have assurance that its detectives are investigating cases, except for reviewing what detectives document. A YID senior official stated that beyond the case reviews, another form of assurance that detectives are investigating cases is when the supervisor reviews follow-up activities documented in a PD Form 252 and randomly pulls cases to review. However, the team is concerned that YID does not appear to have other mechanisms in place to assess investigative practice, such as requiring a sergeant to accompany detectives in the field. A YID manager stated that if there was a supervisor dedicated only to the Missing Persons Section, the supervisor could go into the field to check on the detectives' work.

In August and September 2009, interviewees discussed problems with limited duty officers assigning cases to detectives. The team was concerned that without a manager to assign the cases, there was insufficient managerial monitoring and control of detectives' workloads. An interviewee stated that since 2003, it has been the practice for someone other than a sergeant to assign the cases. Interviewees stated that there have been incidents in which detectives were unaware that cases had been assigned to them. A missing persons detective stated that sometimes limited duty officers do not check the databases to determine whether a received document pertains to an existing case, which results in them creating a duplicate case. Interviewees also stated that limited duty officers were not assigning cases evenly to detectives. In May 2010, a YID manager acknowledged that limited duty officers were assigning cases to detectives, but stated that a sergeant would assign cases going forward and use a transmittal form to show the distribution. In September 2010, the YID manager confirmed that a sergeant is now assigning missing persons cases to detectives. However, YID lacks a written policy or procedure for this process. In addition, the interviewee stated that YID does not require missing persons detectives to provide a written or emailed acknowledgement that they have received cases assigned to them, as this would single-out missing persons detectives for a requirement that other detectives do not have.

Previously, missing persons detectives were significantly inflating their caseload assignments. Recent YID management has addressed this problem. A YID manager informed the team that missing persons detectives previously listed hundreds of cases that were closed by patrol as part of their caseloads, although YID receives approximately 70 open missing persons cases per month. He/she found that detectives were listing these closed cases when all they had to do with the cases was file them in a case jacket. One detective listed hundreds of cases in his

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caseload despite the YID log book not showing that many cases coming in. The manager stated in May 2010 that detectives were only listing open cases in their caseloads, which average 20 cases per detective. The Missing Persons Section sergeant now checks detectives' reported caseloads against information in the Approach database. Interviewees stated that the organization of missing persons records has improved since new managers were assigned to the Missing Persons Section, and limited duty officers are now responsible for filing closed cases.

Cause:⁴⁹ A YID senior official was not aware why case record reviews were not conducted in the past. A YID manager stated that previous missing persons supervisors were overwhelmed with other responsibilities and probably assumed the detectives would not need this level of supervision.

The Missing Persons Section does not have written policies and procedures that instruct supervisors on conducting case reviews. A YID manager stated that he/she had not had time to develop written policies and procedures for these reviews due to his/her multiple responsibilities in managing other units. A YID senior official stated that the Missing Persons Section did not need policies and procedures regarding supervisory reviews although YID could develop them to ensure continuity. Although this official added that a general order mandates monthly case reviews, this does not appear to be accurate as an MPD Policy Development Branch manager clarified that MPD has no specific written order requiring supervisory case reviews to assess the quality of investigative practices other than the requirement to review reports.

A YID manager said that one sergeant cannot effectively manage the Missing Persons Section and the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC)/Human Trafficking unit as well as assist with the Absconder Unit. A YID senior official stated that YID should have a sergeant dedicated exclusively to missing persons because ICAC works on different types of cases that are intensive. However, obtaining resources from MPD headquarters has been a barrier to increasing the number of sergeants at YID. In contrast, an MPD senior official who oversees YID stated that he/she did not see a need for a sergeant dedicated solely to the Missing Persons Section because sergeants should be able to multi-task and handle the job of the lieutenant when the latter is absent. He/she added that it is a disservice to pigeonhole a sergeant in one unit and MPD needs to work with any sergeant who has a problem running two units.

Effect:⁵⁰ The OIG's case record review of missing persons cases found many cases lacked evidence of investigative actions by YID detectives and evidence that missing juveniles were located. Without consistent, ongoing supervision, YID lacks assurance that detectives conduct investigative activities to locate missing juveniles and produce quality work. YID lacks formal and written systematic supervisory controls and supervisory improvements at YID seem overly reliant upon one manager's efforts, a situation which may become more problematic if there is management turnover. Most importantly, children who might otherwise be found and/or saved from harm may be left unprotected and exposed to danger.

⁴⁹ The "cause" is the action or inaction that brought about the condition evaluated.

⁵⁰ The "effect" is the impact of the condition being evaluated.

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Accountability:⁵¹ YID senior officials are responsible for ensuring that Missing Persons Section officials provide adequate and routine supervision.

Recommendations:

- (1) That the Chief of Police ensure that YID develop and implement written policies and procedures for conducting case record reviews and other quality assurance mechanisms to ensure that there is consistent supervisory oversight of investigative practice in the Missing Persons Section.
- (2) That the Chief of Police determine whether a sergeant dedicated solely to the Missing Persons Section is warranted and feasible.

MPD's September 2011 Response, as Received:

- *The YID Commander has been tasked to review and update current written policies, procedures and oversight directives; and determining if a dedicated Missing Person Sergeant is warranted or feasible.*

3. Policies and procedures regarding MPD roles and responsibilities for missing persons investigations are unclear.

Criteria: According to a report from NCMEC, “[M]issing-child report procedures should indicate what happens to the case from time of report through closure. For instance, reports need to be centrally logged, easily located, and well prepared.” This report also states, “Concise procedures eliminating uncertainty among personnel not only lead to more effective case management but also diminish exposure to liability”⁵²

Condition: With respect to missing persons investigations, roles and responsibilities of patrol members and YID members are not clearly articulated in MPD policies. In addition, missing persons coordinators in patrol districts do not have written guidelines beyond the two MPD orders on missing persons, which are not adequate and do not describe their responsibilities. A YID manager stated that MPD School Resource Officers, missing persons coordinators from the patrol districts, and YID should have clear guidelines regarding their roles in investigating missing persons cases.

YID's *Criminal Investigations Manual* contains instructions for YID Missing Persons Section investigations of juvenile missing persons cases. However, it does not articulate the responsibilities of other MPD divisions (e.g., patrol divisions) concerning juvenile missing persons cases, such as how they should communicate and interact with YID on these cases. It

⁵¹ “Accountability” is a description of who is responsible for the condition being evaluated.

⁵² NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, MISSING AND ABDUCTED CHILDREN: A LAW-ENFORCEMENT GUIDE TO CASE INVESTIGATION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 195 (2006).

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does not articulate the actions that YID should take to confirm receipt of these cases from patrol in order to avoid duplication of efforts.⁵³

The OIG reviewed GO-OPS-304.03, *Missing Person Reports*, effective January 30, 2004, and SO-08-03, *MPD Compliance with the National Child Search Assistance Act of 1990*, effective May 8, 2008,⁵⁴ and found the following issues:

- MPD policy is unclear regarding when YID becomes involved in all juvenile missing persons cases. GO-OPS-304.03 states, “Members handling a juvenile missing person case . . . shall . . . [i]mmediately request a member of the Missing Persons Section [YID] to respond to the scene”⁵⁵ This general order section does not limit this requirement to certain types of juvenile missing persons cases, such as critical command post cases. This general order also mandates that YID conduct follow-up investigations on all missing juvenile cases whether critical or non-critical.⁵⁶ However, Section III.C.1 of SO-08-03 states that District missing persons coordinators are responsible for completing “a twenty-four (24) hour check and follow up at seven (7)-day and thirty (30)-day intervals concerning the missing person[.]” but does not require them to request that YID respond to the scene. In October 2009, a YID manager stated that due to the contradiction in the policies, it was not clear when YID should receive missing persons cases, and YID was currently receiving them shortly after the initial reports were made. An interviewee from a patrol district stated that the missing persons coordinators had been working on cases for 7 days before giving them to YID. However, around February 2010, the missing persons coordinators were told to work on these cases for 30 days as stated in an order.
- Neither GO-OPS-304.03 nor SO-08-03 specifies that patrol districts should stop working on missing persons cases once they are given to YID.
- It is unclear who in patrol districts, missing persons coordinators or patrol officers, is responsible for follow-up investigative activities on missing persons cases. SO-08-03 states that missing persons coordinators shall conduct follow-up activities at 24-hour, 7-day, and 30-day intervals. In contrast, GO-OPS-304.03 states that the “District Missing Person Investigator shall: 1. Maintain the Missing Person database to ensure that members conduct the required follow-up in a missing person case” This general order does not define which MPD employees are District Missing Person Investigators. A missing persons coordinator stated that in practice, they are the missing persons investigators. He/she added that patrol officers are required to conduct follow-up activities on critical, non-command post cases, but that they do not. Another missing persons coordinator stated that patrol is required to conduct 24-hour follow-ups and that a sergeant should assign cases to officers for follow-up, but

⁵³ The manual states that YID shall check the accuracy of the first responder’s report.

⁵⁴ According to a YID manager, both of these orders are in effect.

⁵⁵ GO-OPS-304.03 § IV.E.1.b.

⁵⁶ *Id.* § IV.O.1.

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patrol is not consistently conducting follow-up activities. These two coordinators stated that the missing persons coordinators conduct follow-up activities.

- Although SO-08-03 lists missing persons coordinators' responsibilities, including conducting follow-up activities, it does not provide guidance on the types of investigative actions that should be included. For instance, one missing persons coordinator stated that he/she traces cellular telephone calls and speaks to the friends of missing persons, but the team's review indicated that these activities and other investigative techniques are not included in SO-08-03. This missing persons coordinator stated that officers in his/her patrol district consistently conduct follow-up activities in missing persons cases, but they are limited to asking the family if the juvenile returned or if they heard from the child.

YID interviewees stated that there are no written guidelines for the administrative aspects of missing persons functions. In practice, limited duty officers are responsible for entering missing persons cases in a log book and YID's Approach database, filing cases, and checking documents for consistency. According to interviewees, limited duty officers frequently are assigned to and moved from the YID Missing Persons Section.

Cause: In May 2010, an MPD senior official stated that the department was working on a new missing persons general order to clarify how different types of cases are to be handled and the roles of patrol and YID. This official added that a draft had been submitted to senior management, but significant work remained.

A YID manager stated that he/she has not had time, due to multiple responsibilities, to create written guidelines for YID missing persons administrative functions. He/she acknowledged the need to put them in writing.

Effect: The team is concerned that the lack of clarity regarding when YID is to become involved in juvenile missing persons cases may hinder effective case management and result in some cases not coming to YID's attention as soon as they should. In addition, contradictory orders regarding whether patrol officers or missing persons coordinators should conduct follow-up activities may result in some cases not receiving timely attention from either group. Without adequate written guidelines regarding roles and responsibilities of missing persons coordinators, there may be inconsistency in how missing persons coordinators handle cases.

A senior official stated that missing persons coordinators have lacked consistency in handling cases. Although not tested as part of the case review, the team observed in six cases that patrol conducted follow-up activities after cases were assigned to YID. For three of these cases, patrol conducted follow-up activities after YID closed the cases. A YID manager stated that he/she learned from a patrol division missing persons coordinator that he/she was conducting follow-up activities after cases were given to YID, thus duplicating efforts.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ The team interviewed this missing persons coordinator who stated that he/she does not work on cases once they are sent to YID, although he/she will complete PD Form 252s to close cases if he/she is notified that children have returned and the cases are listed as open in WALES/NCIC. He/she added that the time lag between when a PD Form 252 is created and the case is closed in WALES/NCIC contributes to duplicate PD Forms 252.

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Reportedly, these follow-up activities were at the direction of patrol commanders. This manager opined that patrol should cease working on these cases after giving them to YID. Without written guidance and coordination between the divisions, some missing persons investigations may lack follow-up activity while others may have duplication of investigative resources.

The team is concerned that Missing Persons Section employees may not be held fully accountable for performing their administrative tasks because there are no written procedures. A YID manager stated that written procedures are important because within MPD, employees frequently are transferred and must be able to perform the duties of those they replace. According to interviewees, the turnover of limited duty officers assigned to the Missing Persons Section leads to inconsistencies in administrative functions. The team is concerned that the lack of written procedures makes it difficult for those newly assigned to learn their responsibilities and results in inconsistencies.

Accountability: MPD senior officials are responsible for ensuring that there are clear procedures on the roles and responsibilities of patrol officers, missing persons coordinators, and YID detectives in juvenile missing persons cases. YID managers are responsible for ensuring that clear written procedures are developed for Missing Persons Section administrative functions.

Recommendations:

- (1) That the Chief of Police ensure that a new general order containing adequate guidance on the roles and responsibilities of the MPD sections that handle missing persons cases is completed and issued timely and that applicable members are trained on this order once promulgated.
- (2) That the Chief of Police ensure that written procedures are developed for missing persons administrative functions at YID and that missing persons administrative staff, particularly limited duty officers, receive training on these procedures.

OIG Comment: MPD's response appears to partially meet the intent of these recommendations. However, MPD did not mention training its members on the new missing persons general order. According to MPD,

- *As previously stated, General Order 304.3, (Missing Person Reports), dated August 22, 2011, updated all policies, regulations and procedures for reporting, documenting (a. PD Form 251 & 252, running resume) and investigating cases (b. reflect whether the juvenile has been located by YID or patrol and c. interview juvenile upon return or when located).*

Also previously stated, the YID Commander has been tasked to review and update current written policies, procedures and oversight directives. Limited duty officers will receive training on policy and administrative procedures.

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4. The Missing Persons Section lacks assurance that training is adequate.

Criteria: The GAO recommends that:

The agency provides training and counseling in order to help employees maintain and improve their competence for their jobs. Consider the following:

- There is an appropriate training program to meet the needs of all employees.
- The agency emphasizes the need for continuing training and has a control mechanism to help ensure that all employees actually received appropriate training.^{58]}

NCMEC recommends:

Training for personnel in the [missing-child] unit should be ongoing to enhance the specialized expertise of unit members. Areas of instruction might include identifying runaways, investigating family abductions, case management, international family abductions, interviewing techniques, recognizing sexual exploitation and neglect, custody laws, and interagency cooperation.⁵⁹

The District Personnel Manual states that agencies should identify annually the training needs of individual employees as related to agency program objectives.⁶⁰

MPD General Order GO-PER-201.08, entitled *Outside Training Program*, effective May 22, 2009, states that MPD members approved to attend outside training shall submit certificates of successful completion to the Maurice T. Turner Jr., Metropolitan Police Academy (Police Academy).⁶¹ This general order also states that the Police Academy Director shall ensure that training records are updated to reflect the completion of outside training.⁶²

Condition: YID managers and detectives stated that missing persons detectives received NCMEC training, annual Amber Alert training, and portions of Child Abduction Response Team (CART) training.⁶³ However, three YID detectives stated that training was inadequate for missing persons detectives. Two interviewees cited parental kidnapping as an area for training.

⁵⁸ GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL CONTROL MANAGEMENT AND EVALUATION TOOL, GAO-01-1008G 12 (Aug. 2001).

⁵⁹ NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, MISSING AND ABDUCTED CHILDREN: A LAW-ENFORCEMENT GUIDE TO CASE INVESTIGATION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 198 (2006).

⁶⁰ DPM § 1302.4(b).

⁶¹ *Id.* Section IV.I.

⁶² *Id.* Section V.C.5.

⁶³ According to a YID senior official, a CART team assists on more complex missing persons cases, such as parental kidnapping cases or custody issues that involve multiple jurisdictions.

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One of these interviewees also stated that areas for further training include non-familial abductions; working with group homes regarding absconders; cases in which missing persons from other jurisdictions are found in the District; and missing persons cases in general, such as how to conduct a critical command post case. In contrast, three YID managers stated that missing persons detectives had been provided with sufficient training. Two of these managers described training that detectives had taken, such as NCMEC and Amber Alert training. A manager stated that annual refresher training and certification are required for use of WALES and NCIC. Two managers stated that refresher training is beneficial.

The team requested training information from YID and the MPD Police Academy, but MPD gave scant information on training provided to missing persons detectives. YID was only able to provide information on one missing persons training course that one of its detectives took in 2007. The Police Academy provided a list of courses that missing persons detectives had taken beyond those required of all MPD members, such as Professional Development Training, recruit training, and range training. The list reflected 20 courses taken by 4 of the 5 missing persons detectives.⁶⁴ Only one of these courses had been taken since June 2001 (April 2010). The team found that this list demonstrated that missing persons detectives have not received specialized training. While the 20 courses appeared to be focused on investigations, they were not specific to missing persons.⁶⁵ Evidence that missing persons detectives received NCMEC, CART, and annual Amber Alert training was not reflected in training information provided by YID and the Police Academy.

In addition, two YID interviewees stated that training is inadequate for limited duty officers performing missing persons administrative functions.

Cause: A YID manager, who stated that most detectives had received training from NCMEC, did not know why the YID administration section and the Police Academy did not have records of some of the training taken by missing persons detectives. He/she stated that it was unclear whether there was an issue with personnel providing certificates to the YID administration or with the YID administration forwarding certificates to the Police Academy.

According to this manager, there are no individual training plans for the missing persons detectives. Another manager stated that he/she did not know how adequate training was for missing persons detectives because of his/her new role,⁶⁶ and he/she had not had a chance to discuss training with the missing persons detectives.

Some interviewees stated that budget constraints were a barrier to providing training. One detective stated that the Missing Persons Section does not have adequate staffing to provide coverage if detectives are in training, and funding is an issue for some training courses. He/she

⁶⁴ The Police Academy was unable to find a record of training taken by one of the missing persons detectives. The one training course that YID listed was not included in the list from the Police Academy. A Police Academy manager stated that the Police Academy keeps records of external trainings if MPD members provide their training certificates.

⁶⁵ Some of the topics included investigative-psychological approach to detecting danger, crimes against children, clear writing, and court testimony.

⁶⁶ He/she had been in this position for approximately 4 months at the time of this interview.

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added that some detectives are willing to pay for training but coverage remains a barrier and detectives should not have to pay for training out of personal funds. A YID senior official stated that budget constraints prevented detectives from attending CART training as well as MPD implementing CART.

An employee stated that limited duty officers rotate in and out of the Missing Persons Section and are reassigned without warning. Consequently, the outgoing limited duty officer cannot prepare the incoming limited duty officer to perform his/her responsibilities within the Missing Persons Section.

Effect: By not providing and documenting relevant training for missing persons detectives and administrative staff, the team is concerned that MPD lacks assurance that these employees are sufficiently knowledgeable about their responsibilities. One detective stated that training for missing persons detectives would help detectives find juveniles sooner and thereby reduce the number of risky activities for the juveniles.

Another employee opined that if limited duty officers in the Missing Persons Section are not properly trained, they cannot be held accountable. This employee cited an example in which an administrative officer failed to provide the detective assigned to a missing persons case the PD Form 252 completed by patrol, which closed the case. As a result, the detective was unaware of case closure, and possibly conducted investigative activities unnecessarily. Another employee stated that missing persons detectives receive duplicate cases because the limited duty officers who assign cases to detectives have not been trained.

Accountability: YID managers are responsible for ensuring that missing persons detectives and administrative staff are adequately trained. YID and Police Academy managers are responsible for ensuring that training records for missing persons detectives are accurate.

Recommendations:

- (1) That the Chief of Police assess the training that missing persons detectives have taken to determine whether additional training is needed.
- (2) That the Chief of Police ensure that YID members follow MPD procedures and inform the Training Academy of external training courses that missing persons detectives have taken.
- (3) That the Chief of Police ensure that employees with missing persons administrative responsibilities, including limited duty officers, are sufficiently trained.

OIG Comment: **While MPD did not explicitly state agreement with these recommendations, its response appears to meet their intent. Based on its response, the OIG considers the status of Recommendation 2 as closed. MPD stated:**

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- *The YID Commander will assess current training and coordinate any needed training with the MPD Training Division.*

The Commander will query all YID members for external training courses, document the training once confirmed; and the YID Administrative Section will forward said training documentation to the Director, Training Division. YID members with Missing Person responsibilities, including limited duty members will receive coordinated training via the Training Division, which will be documented and placed in the member's unit personnel folder.

5. Due to delays in developing a centralized information system, MPD has inefficient work processes and inadequate technology for missing persons functions.

Background: MPD uses the following management information systems as well as NCIC and WALES for juvenile missing persons information:

- Approach—a database used solely by YID to track juvenile missing persons cases that contains information such as the name of the missing person, address, incident date, and the detective assigned to the case.
- MPD Missing Persons Database—Patrol and YID use this database to track missing persons cases. It includes such information as the missing person's name, incident date, and the name of the person who made the missing person report.
- Records Management System (RMS)—a paperless reporting system MPD uses to record various police activities from PD Form 251 and 252 reports.

Criteria: For processing information, the GAO recommends that agencies employ “a variety of control activities suited to information processing systems to ensure accuracy and completeness[]” and that “[a]ccess to data, files, and programs is appropriately controlled.”⁶⁷ The GAO also recommends that agencies manage, develop, and revise information systems “to continually improve the usefulness and reliability of its communication of information.”⁶⁸

In addition, MPD General Order GO-OPS-304.03, entitled *Missing Person Reports*, effective January 30, 2004, states in Section IV.E.1:

Members handling a juvenile missing person case . . . shall . . .

* * *

⁶⁷ GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL CONTROL MANAGEMENT AND EVALUATION TOOL, GAO-01-1008G, 37 (Aug. 2001) (emphasis omitted).

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 55.

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f. Provide a copy of the PD Form 251, 252, and 899 (Critical Missing Person Investigation Checklist) to the station clerk to be forwarded to [YID] with the morning mail run. . . . [and]

* * *

i. Forward all information concerning juveniles to the Missing Persons Section, [YID].

Condition: Missing persons functions are over-reliant on paper. A YID senior official stated that YID's processes are not automated and that missing persons reports should be paperless. YID tracks missing persons cases by handwriting them in a log book, and then YID performs the duplicative function of entering the same case information in Approach. YID is the central repository for juvenile missing persons information for cases assigned to YID detectives and cases closed by patrol.

The various management information systems are unreliable and have frequent, prolonged outages. During its case record review in February and March 2010, the team intended to compare information in Approach and the MPD Missing Persons Databases, but was unable to do so because the MPD Missing Persons Database was not functioning. A YID senior official stated that the MPD Missing Persons Database is very old, and it crashed because of insufficient data storage capacity. MPD interviewees stated that the MPD Missing Persons Database has not been functional at times ranging from 2 to 4 months. One interviewee added that during one outage, the database lost data that could not be retrieved.

In July 2010, a YID manager stated that Approach crashed recently. After it was reinstalled, there were about 100 cases missing from the system, which had been entered after its last back-up, and that information would have to be re-entered from the log book. In October 2010, he/she stated that Approach had stopped working five times in the previous 2 weeks. He/she added that it had deleted cases and would not save new case entries, apparently because the system was at maximum capacity. This manager also stated that Approach lacks security features, which may allow a detective to delete a case and deny that the case was ever assigned by administrative staff. In addition, Approach cannot display an alert to show whether a case was deleted. During the team's review of missing persons files, PD Forms 252 were not available in RMS.⁶⁹

The various systems are not linked. According to interviewees, Approach and the MPD Missing Persons Database are separate systems that each require manual entry of investigative information and are not linked to RMS, which contains electronic copies of police reports. A manager stated that each of these systems have separate log-ins, except for the MPD Missing Persons Database, which does not require a log-in and is accessed through MPD's intranet. This manager stated that about 95% of information in the MPD Missing Persons Database and

⁶⁹ Subsequent to the team's review, an MPD manager stated that PD Forms 252 were available in RMS and that YID continues to receive hard copies of these reports as well as PD Forms 251.

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Approach is duplicative. He/she did not know why MPD uses both systems to store the same information.

MPD intends to implement an integrated database called the Juvenile Case Management System (JCMS); however, its implementation has been repeatedly delayed. Interviewees stated that MPD is planning to implement JCMS for tracking and investigating cases, including juvenile missing persons cases and child abuse cases. According to a Statement of Work (SOW) for JCMS dated January 7, 2010, the new system will replace multiple applications for managing juvenile cases, automate workflow, streamline processes, and provide effective control over workflow steps.

The OIG team initially learned about implementation of JCMS at the initiation of this inspection in July 2009. In October 2009, a YID manager apprised the team that YID expected JCMS to be operational in November 2009; however, in May 2011, this manager stated that JCMS had not been implemented.

Interviewees stated that JCMS will replace Approach and eliminate the need for paper records. A YID manager added that it will have security features to prevent detectives from deleting cases. It will include a log to reflect when a sergeant assigns cases to detectives. However, a manager said that MPD management decided to maintain RMS as a separate system. This will require users to log on separately to JCMS and RMS. He/she was uncertain whether MPD will continue to use the MPD Missing Persons Database for juvenile missing persons cases after JCMS is implemented.

The team requested and reviewed documents from MPD related to the JCMS procurement. The original contract documents lacked specificity about the development and implementation of JCMS. The SOW for the first contract pertains to providing staff for automating or improving the program applications for youth services case tracking and other MPD functions, such as traffic violation reporting. The contract and its SOW did not include a description of specific objectives or expectations for a new system to manage juvenile cases. The solicitation that included the SOW reflected an issue date of August 6, 2009, and the related contract was effective February 3, 2010. According to contract documents, the contractor agreed to provide up to 5 consultants to work on up to 26 computer systems at a cost of nearly \$575,000, which was later reduced to nearly \$475,000. MPD subsequently contracted for the services of two other consultants to work on JCMS for more than \$119,000 for the period of May 17, 2010, through September 30, 2010.

Cause: According to a YID manager, the flow of missing persons cases within MPD is paper-dependent because MPD is paper-driven. An MPD manager stated that MPD is in the “dark ages” regarding technology and needs staff members who can build information systems.

An MPD employee stated that the JCMS was delayed by changes in its scope and the availability of grant funding. A YID senior official opined that the time spent on developing the system had been reasonable, considering the system functionality YID requested in order to accommodate the information management needs of its five units. In October 2010, a YID manager opined that the developers of JCMS did not seem to understand YID’s information

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technology system requirements. In May 2011, this manager stated that technical issues with the case management functions of JCMS have delayed its implementation. The team questions whether JCMS will adequately streamline MPD processes for juvenile missing persons cases.

Effect: The team is concerned that the current work processes within the Missing Persons Section are inefficient, duplicative, and outdated. A YID manager stated that the Missing Persons Section's reliance on paper consumes staff time. It requires administrative staff to search for cases, assign cases to detectives, file documents, and perform data entry. A YID detective stated that YID sometimes receives multiple documents at different times for the same case, and that these documents are sometimes considered to be separate cases and assigned to different detectives. This results in a duplication of efforts in which multiple calls are made to key contacts unnecessarily. According to interviewees, missing persons detectives sometimes do not receive complete information from patrol districts immediately for the cases they are assigned. According to a manager, a paperless system of reports would improve tracking and monitoring of investigations.

The team questions MPD's ability to accurately track missing persons cases due to unreliable information systems. A YID manager stated that he/she conducted an audit in 2009 of missing persons cases at YID. He/she found that cases were missing information in Approach and that the number of cases listed in Approach differed from that listed in the log book. A missing persons coordinator stated that as patrol and YID use two different databases (the MPD Missing Persons Database and Approach) for missing persons data, he/she cannot see which YID detective is assigned to a case due to lack of access to YID's Approach.

MPD has incurred significant expenses for MPD personnel and contractors to develop JCMS. In addition, the Missing Persons Section continues to use inefficient work processes while waiting for the implementation of JCMS, which is intended to streamline processes and automate workflow. In October 2010, a YID manager stated that he/she was not satisfied with JCMS. Consequently, the team questions the cost-effectiveness of MPD's approach to developing JCMS. Furthermore, delays in implementing JCMS appear to have prolonged YID's reliance on Approach despite the latter's reliability problems.

Accountability: MPD senior officials are responsible for ensuring that information systems used for missing persons provide accurate and complete information.

Recommendations:

- (1) That the Chief of Police assess whether JCMS will be an efficient system that will minimize duplication of efforts and streamline work processes for tracking juvenile missing persons cases. If necessary, expeditiously implement corrective measures to ensure that MPD has efficient information systems and applies efficient work processes to track information on juvenile missing persons cases.

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- (2) If MPD intends to continue with the implementation of JCMS, that the Chief of Police assess barriers to its timely implementation in order to expedite its completion.

OIG Comment: **In its response, MPD stated that it expects JCMS to be operational in October 2011 and that JCMS will streamline its work processes for missing persons cases. The OIG encourages MPD to review the actions taken and time expended to implement JCMS in order to identify ways to efficiently implement any future systems.**

Based on MPD's response, the OIG considers the status of Recommendation 1 as closed. Because JCMS has not yet been implemented, the OIG does not consider the status of Recommendation 2 as closed. Specifically, MPD stated:

- *Inefficient Work Process and Inadequate Technology: The Juvenile Case Management System (JCMS) is replacing the Approach System at YID. It's anticipated that JCMS will be operational October 12, 2011.*

JCMS will have the capability of tracking and investigating cases, including juvenile missing persons and child abuse cases. JCMS will replace multiple applications for managing juvenile cases, automate workflow, streamline processes, and provide effective control over workflow steps.

More important, JCMS will have security features to prevent detectives and coordinators from deleting cases. For system failures and technical issues, a log book will be maintained as a back up system.

6. The Missing Persons Section has not established performance goals.

Criteria: The GAO recommends that “[p]erformance measures and indicators [be] established throughout the organization at the entitywide, activity, and individual level. . . . Actual performance data are continually compared against expected/planned goals and differences are analyzed.”⁷⁰

According to the District of Columbia Office of the City Administrator (OCA), a quality performance management program includes establishing measurable and objective performance goals for significant activities and comparing the actual performance to the target level of performance.⁷¹

⁷⁰ GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL CONTROL MANAGEMENT AND EVALUATION TOOL, GAO-01-1008G, 39 (Aug. 2001).

⁷¹ DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF THE CITY ADMINISTRATOR, BUILDING AND MEASURING A CITY THAT WORKS: A GUIDE TO PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2. *See* http://capstat.oca.dc.gov/Pdf.aspx?pdf=http://oca.dc.gov/oca/lib/oca/performance_toolkit/performance_guide_fy_2010_final.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2010).

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MPD has measurable performance indicators for various types of investigations, including homicide, aggravated assault, and burglary cases. For these specific types of investigations, MPD has established projected goals for tracking clearance rates and measures its actual performance to these goals.⁷²

MPD Special Order SO-08-03 entitled *MPD Compliance with the National Child Search Assistance Act of 1990* states, “YID personnel shall . . . [c]omplete a sixty (60) day follow-up investigation on all missing person reports containing a child”⁷³ YID’s *Criminal Investigations Manual* states that a PD Form 252 shall be completed within 24 hours of assignment of any missing persons case and then every 7 days thereafter until the case is closed, suspended, or changed to a 30-day update schedule.⁷⁴

Condition: YID does not compare its performance to MPD timeliness standards for missing persons cases. A YID manager stated that the Missing Persons Section is not tracking compliance with completing PD Forms 252 within the timeframes of YID’s *Criminal Investigation Manual*.

The Missing Persons Section does not have targets against which it measures its performance, such as the percentage of cases it should close and actually has closed in a certain timeframe or the percentage of investigations in which particular actions were taken. Each month, YID tracks the number of cases open and closed by the division, but does not compare the data to performance goals. In September 2010, a YID manager stated that the only objectives of the Missing Persons Section are to locate and return missing children and to ensure closure of missing persons reports as soon as possible. While this describes the unit’s mission, it is not a measurable objective as it does not contain a numerical or percentage goal or a time standard. A YID senior official stated that the Missing Persons Section does not have performance measures other than what is stated in individual performance evaluations. A YID manager stated that the percentage of cases closed by individual detectives was compared to the percentage of cases closed by the unit in the 2008 performance evaluations. However, as of July 2009, performance ratings based on closure rates had not yet been determined.

Cause: A YID senior official stated that it would not be helpful to have goals for the Missing Persons Section, such as closing a certain percentage of cases in a specific timeframe, because YID does not know the number of investigations it will receive in advance, which affects timeliness. Also, the circumstances of cases vary, and they will not know the circumstances in advance. A YID manager opined that it would not be fair to apply performance standards to missing persons detectives because juveniles who do not want to be found will evade the detectives and that detectives should be judged by their efforts in closing cases. The OIG does not agree that case variation prevents establishment of realistic performance measures.

Effect: According to OCA, the benefits of performance management include improving decision-making as well as encouraging accountability and transparency.

⁷² The clearance rate is used to determine the percentage of crimes solved based on the number of reported crimes.

⁷³ *Id.* § III.E.4.

⁷⁴ METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, 302 and 304 (Jan. 2002).

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The results of the team's case review reinforce the need for YID to set performance measures that its managers can use to track the productivity of its missing persons detectives and identify and address any performance deficiencies. YID is hindered from easily identifying open cases that have languished without investigative action. YID managers did not or could not identify those cases that the team observed lacked evidence of case closure or investigative actions to ensure necessary investigative actions were taken. (For further information on case review results, see page 19).

Accountability: YID management is responsible for identifying and tracking measurable performance goals for the Missing Persons Section.

Recommendation:

That the Chief of Police ensure that performance goals are established and measured for the Missing Persons Section, including, at a minimum, timeliness with completion of PD Forms 252, follow-up activities, and case closure.

OIG Comment: **While MPD stated it plans to track individual performance of YID personnel, MPD did not articulate whether it plans to develop division performance goals for the Missing Persons Section to measure overall performance. MPD stated:**

- *PD Form 50's (Detective Monthly Activity Report) are used to track case work loads and case closures in comparison with the Missing Person Log Book. This would include timely completion of PD Forms 252's, follow-up activities and case closures.*

Pending individual monthly analysis findings and daily observations of detectives and coordinators, YID managers would tailor individual performance goals and measures for said members.

The current Performance Management System (PMS) for Officer and Detectives also applies for performance goals. If a member is identified as a low performer, the member is to receive a Performance Improvement Plan to meet set performance goals.

For strict compliance, the YID Commander will direct YID managers to monitor and track performance goals.

7. The Missing Persons Section lacks adequate equipment for conducting investigations.

Criteria: The GAO *Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool* states that management should ensure that “[e]mployees are provided . . . tools to perform their duties and responsibilities, improve performance, enhance their capabilities, and meet the demands of changing organizational needs.”⁷⁵

⁷⁵ GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL CONTROL MANAGEMENT AND EVALUATION TOOL, GAO-01-1008G 36 (Aug. 2001).

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Condition: YID managers, detectives, and limited duty officers stated that the Missing Persons Section needs cellular telephones and laptops for detectives as well as mug shot retrieval capabilities, scanners, and color printers to make flyers with photographs of missing children. YID detectives stated that the Missing Persons Section does not have an unmarked police car and that juveniles who have run away avoid marked police cars. However, a YID manager stated that missing persons detectives can use unmarked cars from the YID child abuse investigation squads. Another YID manager commented that lockers were needed to store uniforms and equipment, such as civil disturbance, chemical, and biohazard gear. He/she added that some officers are storing this equipment near their desks, creating a risk of theft.

In May 2010, a YID senior official stated that YID received 10 cellular telephones, and 1 of these was assigned to the Missing Persons Section. He/she added that having detectives sharing a cellular telephone is not effective because they are often in the field separately. In June 2010, an MPD senior official stated that MPD was planning to purchase laptops for all of its detectives. In May 2011, a YID manager stated that YID received about 10 laptops, but only 1 missing persons detective has a laptop.

Cause: A YID senior official stated that YID requested resources from MPD, including scanners and color printers, although needed equipment has not been supplied due to budgetary constraints. However, an MPD senior official stated that he/she relies on managers to tell him/her what items are needed and that he/she has not denied requests from YID. According to this official, cellular telephones are extremely expensive due to their recurring costs, but that YID's pool of cellular telephones for members to share could probably be increased if requested. This official added that he/she had not received requests from YID regarding printers or scanners and that YID has mug shot retrieval capabilities.

Effect: The lack of needed supplies and equipment may hinder the efficiency of the Missing Persons Section. A YID manager stated that cellular telephones would allow detectives to call witnesses and complainants from the field. One detective stated that he/she had to use his/her personal cellular telephone for work as he/she does not have a work cellular telephone. Another detective stated that they need cellular telephones, and that sometimes detectives do not want the family of the victim to be able to hear the other side of a conversation, which is an issue with radios. According to a YID senior manager, laptops would increase efficiency because detectives could complete reports while in the field. A YID manager stated that laptops would allow detectives to run WALES checks without calling dispatch or returning to the office. Another detective stated that the computer and scanner used for creating posters are not adequate.

Accountability: YID managers are responsible for assessing current equipment and supplies available for the Missing Persons Section and requesting any needed items. MPD senior officials are responsible for assessing these requests and current budget constraints to determine whether any of these items are essential and may be procured.

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Recommendation:

That the Chief of Police assess the Missing Persons Section's equipment and supply needs and procure those items deemed essential for conducting investigations efficiently and effectively.

OIG Comment: **In its response, MPD detailed various resources that it has procured. However, for most of these resources, MPD did not clarify which are for the benefit of the Missing Persons Section. Specifically, MPD stated:**

- *Calendar years 2009/2010, the Corporate Support Bureau, Reproduction Section, installed 4 Xerox copiers to assist with scanning of multiple files. These multi-functional machines are able to copy, scan, print and fax.*

Calendar year 2011, Reproduction installed a HP 3000n Color printer for Missing Person photos. Also installed was a high volume desk top Color scanner to assist the unit with daily task.

YID has eleven Dell Laptop computers (10 signed out), nine Tough books (all signed out), sixteen mini-laptops (8 signed out) and 12 cell phones (all signed out).

Thirty-one vehicles are assigned and all are available to be signed out to a coordinator or detective during a tour of duty for duty related assignments.

8. Missing persons cases in patrol districts are not investigated consistently when missing persons coordinators are absent.

Background: As of June 2010, there was one missing persons coordinator in each of MPD's seven districts. Missing persons coordinators stated that they investigate juvenile and adult missing persons cases. MPD orders are contradictory regarding who in patrol districts, missing persons coordinators or patrol officers, are responsible for follow-up investigative activities on missing persons cases (see finding 3). According to one missing persons coordinator, he/she is responsible for juvenile critical non-command post and non-critical missing persons cases for 30 days, at which point the open cases are given to YID. YID is notified immediately and reports to the scene for critical command post juvenile missing persons cases.

Criteria: MPD Special Order SO-08-03 entitled *MPD Compliance with the National Child Search Assistance Act of 1990* states "The District Missing Person Coordinator shall . . . [c]omplete a twenty-four (24) hour check and follow up at seven (7)-day and thirty (30)-day intervals concerning the missing person" *Id.* Section III.C.1.

Condition: Interviewees stated that there is inadequate coverage of missing persons cases when MPD district missing persons coordinators are on leave or away from their assigned districts during routine redeployments. According to interviewees, missing persons coordinators

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are redeployed from their assigned districts for 1 week every 6 weeks to provide increased police presence on the streets, reduce crime, and place missing persons coordinators back into the field to re-acclimate them to fieldwork.⁷⁶

According to interviewees, critical non-command post and non-critical juvenile missing persons cases are not investigated when missing persons coordinators are absent. Interviewees stated that when missing persons coordinators return, they have cases waiting for them to investigate. A manager from a patrol district stated that the hit-and-run coordinator works on missing persons cases when the missing persons coordinator is absent, but could not confirm that missing persons cases are investigated in these situations. Interviewees stated that patrol officers are supposed to conduct certain follow-up activities on these cases but are not consistently conducting them in some districts. As a result, the missing persons coordinators handle these follow-up activities. Consequently, the OIG team questions whether follow-up activities are routinely occurring on missing persons cases when these coordinators are absent.

Cause: Interviewees stated that there is no written policy on covering missing persons cases when missing persons coordinators are absent. According to interviewees, while hit-and-run coordinators are supposed to cover missing persons cases when missing persons coordinators are absent, this does not occur. Two interviewees stated that the hit-and-run coordinators for their districts do not have time for missing persons cases because of their own caseloads. One of these interviewees added that the hit-and-run coordinator is not trained on handling missing persons cases.

A manager in a patrol district stated that missing persons investigations are not conducted when the missing persons coordinator is absent because the coordinator is the only person assigned to work on missing persons cases. He/she added that his/her unit is very busy and cannot cover missing persons cases when the missing persons coordinator is absent.

Two missing persons coordinators stated that the lack of consistent follow-up by patrol officers when coordinators are redeployed may be due to inadequate training for patrol officers on missing persons cases.

Effect: A manager stated that a critical non-command post case could be overlooked when the missing persons coordinator is absent. One missing persons coordinator stated that sometimes he/she has approximately 40 missing persons cases, including critical juvenile cases, to be investigated when he/she returns from redeployment. A missing persons coordinator stated that when he/she returns and calls families, they are upset because no one has called them about an investigation of their cases. He/she added that it is more difficult to locate a missing person as time passes because he/she can travel further away and change appearance to be more difficult to recognize. It is also more difficult to get in touch with those who might know something about the case, and memories fade. Furthermore, the lack of adequate coverage of these cases affects compliance with MPD's timeliness standards. A missing persons coordinator stated that

⁷⁶ A missing persons coordinator clarified that these redeployments differ from MPD's All Hands on Deck (AHOD) program. During this program, all available police officers and recruits are called to duty and assigned to street patrol throughout the District for 48 hours.

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24-hour, 7-day, and 30-day follow-up activities are usually not performed when the missing persons coordinator is redeployed.

Accountability: MPD managers are responsible for ensuring that there is adequate coverage of missing persons cases when District missing persons coordinators are absent from their districts.

Recommendation:

That the Chief of Police develop and implement procedures to ensure adequate coverage when missing persons coordinators are absent, such as having a YID missing persons detective rotate among districts to work on missing persons cases when these coordinators are redeployed.

OIG Comment: **In its response, MPD stated that it has reallocated its missing persons coordinators from Patrol Divisions to YID. MPD stated:**

- *Effective August 22, 2011, five Missing Person Coordinators were transferred from the districts to YID; which totals ten for the Missing Persons Section. YID managers will monitor and track cases through monthly case reviews.*

When Missing Person Section members are unavailable, responsible managers will reassign hot cases to available members for follow up and closure. PD Form 50's (Detective Monthly Activity Reports) will also provide an alert mechanism.

Based on MPD's response, the OIG considers the status of this recommendation to be closed. General Order 304.3 outlines the distinct responsibilities of the missing persons coordinators at YID, which includes focusing on critical non-command post cases and ensuring follow-up actions are taken. However, it is unclear how communication between YID and Patrol Districts will occur on missing persons cases without having missing persons coordinators to serve as a centralized point of contact in Patrol Districts. The OIG encourages MPD to monitor this re-organization of missing persons functions and modify it as needed.

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As previously stated, one objective of the special evaluation was to assess management of JPC operations. The OIG examined areas such as the adequacy of security, policies, procedures, supervision, and staffing levels. The OIG issued a MAR (MAR 10-I-001) regarding the poor security of members' service weapons at the JPC and inadequate procedures for reporting and investigating missing weapons (see MAR summary on page 13).

In addition to the Compliance Form for Priority Matter and finding on the timeliness of JPC processing in this section, in the early phases of fieldwork, the team learned of concerns with staffing levels at the JPC. According to a May 2009 memorandum from YID managers requesting more JPC staff members as well as interviewee feedback in July and August 2009, low staffing levels at the JPC created a potentially unsafe work environment. In July and August 2009, interviewees stated that inadequate staffing at the JPC created safety risks. Reportedly, shifts had only two officers or an officer and a civilian technician on duty to process juveniles and ensure facility security. A senior official stated that the JPC should have a minimum of three employees per shift. This issue is not a finding in this report because in October 2009, the OIG learned that the JPC received five additional officers, which a YID senior official stated is adequate.

Another matter for MPD to explore is the feasibility of stationing a social worker at the JPC. A YID senior official stated that a social worker should be assigned to the JPC to conduct assessments of all juveniles that come through the JPC to identify any critical needs and make referrals for needed services. This social worker could be from another District agency, such as CFSA. While MPD has discussed this idea with CFSA's Director, there has been no formal proposal. An MPD senior official stated that he/she advocated for having a social worker at the JPC, but CFSA and nonprofit agencies do not have the budget for this scenario.

9. MPD civilian processing technicians' authority to use force on prisoners/detainees is not clearly defined.

JPC staff includes one civilian processing technician. According to a YID manager, the JPC technician has the same responsibilities as an MPD officer assigned to the JPC and may physically subdue combative juveniles as needed. The OIG reviewed applicable criteria pertaining to use of force and concluded that due to a lack of clarity, the legal authority regarding civilian processing technicians' use of force may be reasonably questioned. Neither the MPD General Order entitled *Use of Force* (GO-RAR-901.07) nor 6A DCMR § 207.1 define the term "member" for determining which MPD employees are authorized to use force in accordance with MPD policy.

On January 25, 2010, the OIG issued a Compliance Form for Priority Matter to MPD regarding this issue. MPD responded on April 1, 2010, and August 6, 2010. MPD indicated that it will modify the position description for cellblock processing technicians to remove use of Armament Systems and Procedures (ASP) tactical batons and Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray as part of their duties, implement training on use of hand controls and defensive tactics for cellblock personnel, and amend its general orders to define the term member and clarify use of force

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investigations. The Compliance Form for Priority Matter and MPD's responses can be found at Appendix 2.

MPD's September 2011 Response, as Received:

- *Civilian Technicians; including Juvenile Processing Center (JPC) technicians receive Use of Force Continuum Training at the Training Division and are certified yearly. The Use of Force Continuum now applies to Civilian Technicians and the Force Investigation Team (FIT) will conduct the investigation per Department guidelines.*

10. The JPC does not adequately track processing times for juveniles and does not process all juveniles timely after arrest.

Criteria: According to the MPD Special Order entitled *The 'Lively Standard,'* SO-04-05, effective March 23, 2004, MPD is to process prisoners within 4 hours. This "includes from the time of arrest until the time the prisoner is ready to be transported to court."⁷⁷ This Special Order also states, "Members shall make all reasonable efforts to ensure that all prisoners are processed, and either released . . . , presented to court, or ready to be delivered to court within four hours from the time of the arrest."⁷⁸ According to this special order, MPD adopted the 4-hour time limit established by the court as department policy pursuant to *Lively v. Cullinane* (451 F. Supp. 1000 (1978)). This lawsuit pertained to whether MPD violated arrestees' constitutional rights by detaining them for an unreasonable period of time before presenting them to the court.

The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) contained in the *Youth Investigations Branch Juvenile Processing Center Manual* (the JPC Manual) state that the JPC lieutenant shall "[w]hen notified, immediately begin an inquiry that provides an explanation and justification for exceeding the 4 hour time limit in processing a juvenile[] [and] [e]nsure that proper notifications are made and an investigation conducted, if warranted." *Id.* § V.A.1.g-h. The JPC Manual's Civilian Processing Technician section states, "When a respondent has not been processed within three hours of arrest, the Processing Technician shall notify the JPC sergeant, lieutenant and/or [YID] Watch Commander."⁷⁹

Condition: Neither the JPC's processing SOPs nor MPD Special Order SO-04-05 specify how long processing should take after arrested juveniles arrive at JPC and before transporting them to court. Consequently, MPD officials made a number of conflicting statements on this subject. For example, a YID senior official stated that the JPC should process detainees within 3 hours in all cases, and he/she did not think there were any cases of the JPC detaining juveniles for more than 3 hours. In contrast to that statement, a JPC manager stated that processing time for juveniles can take 5 to 6 hours. Another JPC interviewee explained that the JPC has 3 hours from the time of arrest to process a juvenile and MPD has 1 hour to transport the juvenile to court. Another JPC interviewee informed the team that "[f]our hours is not too

⁷⁷ *Id.* § I.

⁷⁸ *Id.* § III.A.

⁷⁹ *Id.* §§ I and II.2.

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long” to process prisoners. Another YID manager stated that juveniles should not be at the JPC for more than 4 hours and they are usually there less than 3.

The team analyzed select JPC juvenile processing data from 2009 and 2010 to determine the length of time taken for juvenile processing.⁸⁰ It first reviewed the July 2009 *Juvenile Processing Center Monthly Population Report* (Report). The Report does not show times that account for the entire period of detention, from the time of arrest to the time of transport of the juvenile to court. It shows only the “Time Admitted” to the JPC and the “Time Discharged.” There was no data regarding the number of hours spent processing each juvenile, nor the number of cases in which processing extended beyond MPD’s 4-hour requirement. Of the 316 juvenile cases listed in the Report,⁸¹ JPC processed 78% (246 cases) within 4 hours, while 22% (70 cases) took more than 4 hours.

The team also reviewed handwritten pages from the June 11, 2010, and July 9, 2010, JPC daily log book used to record the arrival and departure of arrested juveniles.⁸² As shown in Table 3 below, of 24 cases processed, 83% (20 cases) were completed within 4 hours, and 17% (4 cases) took longer.⁸³ Although the team only tested two dates, if this pattern of noncompliance is actually occurring over the course of a year, it is indicative of a more serious problem with MPD complying with the *Lively* Standard.

**Table 3. JPC Processing Times
June 11 and July 9, 2010**

Processing Time Intervals	Number of Juveniles Processed
0 to 1 hour	2
1:01 to 2 hours	4
2:01 to 3 hours	11
3:01 to 4 hours	3
More than 4 hours (not in compliance)	4

A JPC interviewee stated that the JPC did not track the time at which it completed processing a detainee; rather, it reflects when the juvenile left the JPC. Also, the JPC does not provide reports on processing timeliness to YID. He/she added that the JPC records entrance and departure times manually in a log book and does not have a computer system for this task. The

⁸⁰ The data analyzed by the team did not show the time of arrest by MPD. Also, it did not reflect when the JPC completed processing a detainee; rather, the JPC tracks the time that the juvenile leaves the JPC. Therefore, this data is not sufficient to thoroughly assess MPD’s compliance with the *Lively* Standard.

⁸¹ An additional 11 cases listed in the July 2009 report were not included in the analysis because they stated “ADULT” and did not list time admitted and time discharged.

⁸² On July 16, 2010, the team randomly selected one day from July and one school day in June 2010. For the two dates selected, the JPC provided a copy of the pages from the log book recording two sets of times without juveniles’ names or other identifying information. While the log book did not have headings to label what these sets of times represented, a JPC manager clarified that they were the times a juvenile arrives and leaves the JPC. The JPC provided information pertaining to 25 juveniles, one of whom was excluded because the juvenile was taken to a hospital.

⁸³ Average processing time was 2 hours and 46 minutes, and the median was 2 hours and 37 minutes. Processing time ranged from 40 minutes to as long as 5 hours and 50 minutes.

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team notes that even if the JPC were to attempt to produce statistics from the entrance and departure times recorded in its log book, those times would not accurately reflect MPD's performance in complying with the 4-hour processing standard because that standard extends from the time of arrest to the time a prisoner is released, presented to court, or ready to be delivered to court. A YID senior official stated that YID does not compile statistics on the timeliness of juvenile processing.

Cause: A YID senior official appeared to be unaware of delays in juvenile processing. This official stated that YID is not tracking statistics on juvenile processing timeliness because to this official's knowledge, there were no cases of the JPC holding detainees for more than 3 hours. According to this official, he/she was not aware of investigative reports of JPC delays. If there were such delays, YID management should receive reports because a delay would be cause for an investigation.

According to a JPC interviewee, when the JPC is busy, it may take longer than 3 hours to process detainees. Another JPC interviewee stated that after the arrest of a juvenile for unauthorized use of a vehicle, the arresting officer has to wait at the scene for a crane to arrive for the vehicle. Additionally, juveniles arrested for serious felonies are interviewed at YID before arriving at the JPC. Another interviewee stated that some juveniles are transported to a hospital for assessment and that these cases may go beyond the allowable timeframe.

Interviewees mentioned the following additional factors that contribute to delays in juvenile processing:

- JPC's heavy workload and low number of available officers at times;
- officers waiting for a sergeant to sign paperwork;
- during AHOD, the JPC operates with minimum staffing;
- waiting for the DYRS intake office to open;
- waiting for officers from other law enforcement agencies, such as the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) police, to complete paperwork at their offices to submit to the JPC;
- parents late in picking up juveniles;⁸⁴
- waiting for arresting officers to arrive or complete paperwork; and
- having only one LiveScan machine, which is used to take fingerprints electronically, when there are many juveniles to process at once.

Effect: YID managers appear to be unaware of how many juveniles take longer than 4 hours to process. Consequently, juvenile detention at the JPC may be excessive and violate MPD policy developed to address prolonged detention in response to a lawsuit. Further, this practice may result in additional litigation against MPD.

Accountability: YID managers are responsible for ensuring that JPC staff exert all reasonable efforts to process juveniles within 4 hours of arrest. These managers are also

⁸⁴ A JPC interviewee stated that the recorded end time for juveniles who are diverted is when their parents picked them up, which may be hours after the JPC finishes processing the juveniles.

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responsible for assessing JPC scheduling, staffing, and other factors that affect MPD compliance with timeliness requirements.

Recommendations:

- (1) That the Chief of Police require that YID electronically track the time of a juvenile's arrest, arrival at the JPC, and release or court transport time in order to calculate intervals between these times and produce monthly performance statistics to assess compliance with the *Lively Standard* and take corrective action as needed.
- (2) That the Chief of Police determine whether changes in JPC staffing patterns, an additional LiveScan machine, or other changes are needed to improve processing times.

OIG Comment: MPD's response appears to meet the intent of these recommendations. As such, the OIG considers the status of these two recommendations as closed. Specifically, MPD stated:

- *Adequately Track Processing: JPC will now document juvenile arrival and departure times via an electronic stamp (MPD will purchase).*

Arrest times for juveniles are electronically documented on a PD Form 379 (Juvenile Prosecution Report) and a PD Form 163 (Adult Prosecution Report) if certified by the court as an adult for Title 16 only after receiving the applicable prosecution report from the arresting officer.

To meet the "Lively Standard": a JPC manager or acting manager will reach out to the arresting officer upon their arrival at JPC to obtain the arrest time. JPC will compare the arrest times versus the arrival times and if two hours has expired, the JPC manager or acting manager will notify the YID Watch Commander for corrective action.

For other organizational elements and outside agency related factors (late or no paperwork, lengthy interviews, etc.), the YID Watch Commander will notify the respective Watch Commander for corrective action and notate said actions on the YID Watch Commander Log.

The YID Watch Commander will attempt to rectify JPC related factors (numerous juveniles being processed, parent late picking up juvenile, Live Scan problems, etc.) and notate said corrective actions on the YID Watch Commander Log. If applicable, the YID Watch Commander will obtain IS numbers per Department guidelines and also notate the YID Watch Commander Log.

For strict compliance of the "Lively Standard", the YID Commander has updated the YID Watch Commander Log to reflect hourly Lively Standard Checks per watch.

JUVENILE PROCESSING CENTER

Staffing Pattern: JPC has one supervisor and six members assigned per shift, which totals seven, hence staffing is adequate. The possibility of another Live Scan machine will be explored based on extensive work load studies.

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

- Appendix 1:** List of Findings and Recommendations
- Appendix 2:** Compliance Form for Priority Matter Regarding Authority of Civilian Processing Technicians to Use Force and MPD Responses
- Appendix 3:** PD Form 251 and PD Form 252

APPENDIX 1

APPENDICES

List of Findings and Recommendations

Summaries of Management Alert Reports

1. **Confidential information is not secure, and building conditions may pose health hazards.**
2. **Law enforcement members' firearms are poorly secured at the Juvenile Processing Center, and MPD has inadequate policies and procedures for reporting and investigating missing weapons.**
3. **Policy and training deficiencies hinder MPD officers' responses to suspected child abuse and neglect.**

That the Chief of Police update the Inspector General on MPD's efforts to work with CFSA to:

- a. develop additional training for all affected MPD members (beyond CFSA's online mandated reporter training) to ensure that officers understand their specific responsibility to recognize, respond to, and report suspected child abuse and neglect;
- b. receive accurate information regarding which MPD officers have completed CFSA online training for mandated reporters; and
- c. provide the Inspector General with the current percentage of MPD employees who have taken CFSA's online training for mandated reporters.

Missing Persons Section

1. **Case record review reveals inconsistent and inadequate investigative actions by YID and patrol members on missing persons cases.**
 - a. *YID lacks evidence that its detectives investigate missing persons cases.*
 - b. *Some missing persons cases did not reflect whether the juvenile had been located by YID or patrol.*
 - c. *Patrol and YID rarely interview juveniles once they return.*
 - (1) That the Chief of Police ensure that juvenile missing persons cases are adequately investigated and that investigative activities are properly documented on PD Forms 251 and 252 by YID and patrol.
 - (2) That the Chief of Police analyze the workload and staffing of the Missing Persons Section and, if needed, implement changes to maximize efficient use of MPD staff.
 - (3) That the Chief of Police ensure that MPD members confirm the return of juvenile missing persons by interviewing these juveniles when they return or are located.

APPENDICES

2. Supervision of the Missing Persons Section has been inadequate.

- (1) That the Chief of Police ensure that YID develop and implement written policies and procedures for conducting case record reviews and other quality assurance mechanisms to ensure that there is consistent supervisory oversight of investigative practice in the Missing Persons Section.
- (2) That the Chief of Police determine whether a sergeant dedicated solely to the Missing Persons Section is warranted and feasible.

3. Policies and procedures regarding MPD roles and responsibilities for missing persons investigations are unclear.

- (1) That the Chief of Police ensure that a new general order containing adequate guidance on the roles and responsibilities of the MPD sections that handle missing persons cases is completed and issued timely and that applicable members are trained on this order once promulgated.
- (2) That the Chief of Police ensure that written procedures are developed for missing persons administrative functions at YID and that missing persons administrative staff, particularly limited duty officers, receive training on these procedures.

4. The Missing Persons Section lacks assurance that training is adequate.

- (1) That the Chief of Police assess the training that missing persons detectives have taken to determine whether additional training is needed.
- (2) That the Chief of Police ensure that YID members follow MPD procedures and inform the Training Academy of external training courses that missing persons detectives have taken.
- (3) That the Chief of Police ensure that employees with missing persons administrative responsibilities, including limited duty officers, are sufficiently trained.

5. Due to delays in developing a centralized information system, MPD has inefficient work processes and inadequate technology for missing persons functions.

- (1) That the Chief of Police assess whether JCMS will be an efficient system that will minimize duplication of efforts and streamline work processes for tracking juvenile missing persons cases. If necessary, expeditiously implement corrective measures to ensure that MPD has efficient information systems and applies efficient work processes to track information on juvenile missing persons cases.
- (2) If MPD intends to continue with the implementation of JCMS, that the Chief of Police assess barriers to its timely implementation in order to expedite its completion.

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6. **The Missing Persons Section has not established performance goals.**

That the Chief of Police ensure that performance goals are established and measured for the Missing Persons Section, including, at a minimum, timeliness with completion of PD Forms 252, follow-up activities, and case closure.

7. **The Missing Persons Section lacks adequate equipment for conducting investigations.**

That the Chief of Police assess the Missing Persons Section's equipment and supply needs and procure those items deemed essential for conducting investigations efficiently and effectively.

8. **Missing persons cases in patrol districts are not investigated consistently when missing persons coordinators are absent.**

That the Chief of Police develop and implement procedures to ensure adequate coverage when missing persons coordinators are absent, such as having a YID missing persons detective rotate among districts to work on missing persons cases when these coordinators are redeployed.

Juvenile Processing Center

9. **MPD civilian processing technicians' authority to use force on prisoners/detainees is not clearly defined.**

10. **The JPC does not adequately track processing times for juveniles and does not process all juveniles timely after arrest.**

- (1) That the Chief of Police require that YID electronically track the time of a juvenile's arrest, arrival at the JPC, and release or court transport time in order to calculate intervals between these times and produce monthly performance statistics to assess compliance with the *Lively Standard* and take corrective action as needed.
- (2) That the Chief of Police determine whether changes in JPC staffing patterns, an additional LiveScan machine, or other changes are needed to improve processing times.

APPENDIX 2

APPENDICES

**District of Columbia
Office of the Inspector General**

Findings and Recommendations

**COMPLIANCE FORM
FOR PRIORITY MATTER**

Use this form to report actions on recommendations made by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) during or following an inspection of your agency, program, or other matters. Include on this form all information necessary to show compliance with the recommendation. *Fax and then mail* the completed form and any attachments to Office of the Inspector General, Attention: [REDACTED]. The OIG fax number is 202-727-6992. The address is 717 14th Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20005. Telephone: 202-727-2540.

SPECIAL EVALUATION OF: Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Youth Investigations Division (YID)

PERIOD OF SPECIAL EVALUATION: Ongoing (Start: July 2009)

FINDING:

MPD civilian processing technicians' authority to use force on prisoners/detainees is not clearly defined. The MPD's Juvenile Processing Center (JPC) staff includes one civilian processing technician. A YID manager stated that the JPC technician has the same responsibilities as an MPD officer assigned to the JPC and may physically subdue combative juveniles as needed. The OIG reviewed applicable criteria pertaining to use of force and concluded that due to a lack of clarity, the legal authority regarding civilian processing technicians' use of force may be reasonably questioned.

The position description that covers all MPD Cellblock Processing Technicians states that an individual in this position "[s]ubdues unruly or combative prisoners and uses the minimum level of force necessary to prevent violence, escape, self-defense, etc. . . ." *Id.* at 3. Furthermore, according to the *Youth Investigations Branch Juvenile Processing Center Manual* (JPC Manual), "Processing Technicians shall not strike or use any form of physical force on a respondent, except when necessary in self defense, or to prevent violence to another person or coworker."¹ However, the DCMR and an MPD General Order on the subject do not clearly grant MPD civilian processing technicians such authority. According to 6A DCMR § 207.1, it is MPD policy "that each member of the department shall in all cases use only the minimum amount of force which is consistent with the accomplishment of his or her mission" An MPD General Order entitled Use of Force (GO--RAR--901.07) states, "Members in response to resistant or dangerous individuals may apply escalating options of force . . ." as outlined in MPD's Use of Force Continuum chart. *Id.* § V B. This policy describes use of force options that members may apply, ranging from cooperative controls (e.g., verbal persuasion) through deadly force, in proportion to circumstances encountered.

Neither the General Order nor the DCMR defines the term "member" for purposes of determining which MPD employees are authorized to use force in accordance with MPD policy. Consequently, it is unclear

¹ *Id.* § IV. A YID manager reported that the JPC technician received training related to use of force in 2000.

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**District of Columbia
Office of the Inspector General
Findings and Recommendations
COMPLIANCE FORM
FOR PRIORITY MATTER**

whether civilian processing technicians are authorized to use force in performance of their official duties. It is also unclear whether the District could rely on MPD’s use of force policy to shield itself from legal liability in the event that an MPD civilian processing technician’s use of force results in injury to a prisoner/detainee or the civilian processing technician.

It should also be noted that there is an inconsistency in applicable criteria regarding civilian processing technicians’ use of weapons in the JPC. The position description for Cellblock Processing Technicians states that their duties include using Armament Systems and Procedures, Inc. (ASP) tactical batons and Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray under MPD guidelines. In contrast, Section IV of the JPC Manual states, “Processing Technicians shall not carry weapons of any kind.” (Emphasis in the original.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Chief of Police amend GO--RAR--901.07 to explicitly define the term “member” and, if necessary, issue a separate use of force policy that pertains solely to MPD’s civilian processing technicians.
2. That the Chief of Police issue explicit policy and procedures regarding MPD civilian processing technicians’ authority to use weapons, and clarify whether civilian processing technicians working with juveniles are prohibited from carrying weapons.

RESPONSE DUE TO THE OIG: February 16, 2010

AGENCY ACTION TAKEN (attach additional information as necessary):

RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL:

Name: _____ **Title:** _____
Phone: _____ **Fax:** _____
Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

APPENDICES



GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Charles J. Willoughby
Inspector General
Office of the Inspector General
717 14th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Re: Special Evaluation Of Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Youth
Investigations Division - Period of Special Evaluation: Ongoing (Start July of 2009)

This letter is in response to the ongoing period of special evaluation of the Metropolitan Police Department's Youth Investigations Division that commenced in 2009. The Office of the Inspector General sent a report with findings and recommendations to the Metropolitan Police Department recommending the following:

1. That the Chief of Police amend GO RAR 901.07 to explicitly define the term "member" and if necessary, issue a separate use of force policy that pertains solely to MPD's civilian processing technicians.
2. That the Chief of Police issue explicit policy and procedures regarding MPD civilian processing technicians' authority to sue weapons, and clarify whether civilian processing technicians working with juveniles are prohibited from carrying weapons.

Agency Action Taken

In the report to the Chief of Police, the OIG quotes passages from MPD manuals, MPD General Orders, MPD position descriptions, the DCMR and MPD's Force Continuum. The report suggests that there is a contradiction between the various rules and regulations that apply to MPD. In order to fully evaluate all of the documents referenced in the OIG report, the COP has assigned MPD's Strategic Services Bureau in consultation with MPD's General Counsel to review these documents and to take the necessary actions to make sure that the information in these documents relative to use of force by civilian members of the MPD are consistent. It is anticipated that this review will take approximately sixty days. Once the review is completed, MPD will be in a better position to comment on the recommendations made above.

If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,



Cathy L. Lanier
Chief of Police

P.O. Box 1606, Washington, D.C. 20013-1606

APPENDICES



GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT



2010 AUG 16 PM 3: 29

AUG - 6 2010

Charles J. Willoughby
Office of the Inspector General
Government of the District of Columbia
717 14th Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Willoughby:

This correspondence is in regards to your "Compliance Form For Priority Matter" dated January 25, 2010, in reference to policy recommendations within the Metropolitan Police Department and supplemental dated July 5, 2010.

The following is our current action plan regarding civilian cell block technicians and use of force and weapons training.

Attached is a benchmark survey conducted by IAB of eight (8) local agencies to determine if they used civilian cell block technicians and whether they were armed with weapons. The survey found that three (3) local agencies use civilian cell block technicians (Calvert County Detention Center, Anne Arundel County, and Prince George's County Corrections). Hand Controls (e.g., pressure points, pain compliance, and wrist locks) and OC spray are the leading use of force options.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1) *MPD's policy should be that civilian members should not be issued, nor should they carry, weapons of any kind. The group expressed concern that given the small confines of the Central Cell Block (CCB), it would be dangerous to deploy OC Spray or ASPs. Weapons are not currently allowed inside the CCB, and the group feels it is not advisable to introduce weapons into the CCB environment.*
 - o **ACTION ITEM:** *Upon approval, the position description for Cellblock Processing Technician should be modified to remove use of the ASP and OC Spray as part of their duties. (Owner: PDB)*
- 2) *MPD policy should clarify that civilian members should only use force in defense of themselves or others.*
 - o **ACTION ITEM:** *Upon approval, GO-RAR-901.07 (Use of Force) should be amended to include the following rules:*

P.O. Box 1606, Washington, D.C. 20013-1606

APPENDICES

- "Civilian members shall not be issued and shall not carry weapons of any kind;" and
 - "Civilian members may only use force in defense of themselves or of others."
- 3) Cell Block Technicians, both sworn and civilian, should receive tailored training on use of force and defensive tactics that focuses on hand control techniques (e.g., pressure points, pain compliance, wrist locks) and handcuffing techniques.
- **ACTION ITEMS:**
 - 1) Upon approval, MPA should develop a training module on use of hand controls and defensive tactics for all cell block personnel to be administered this year and every two (2) years thereafter. (Owner: PDB)
 - 2) Upon approval, GO-RAR-901.08 should be amended to add the requirement that MPA conduct training for cell block personnel every two (2) years on use of force (hand controls) and defensive tactics. A draft General Order Change with the recommended language is attached for review and approval. (Owner: SSB)
- 4) Consistent with the OIG's recommendations, MPD's force policy should explicitly define the term member.

ACTION ITEMS: Upon approval, amend GO-RAR-901.07 (Use of Force) and GO-RAR-901.08 (Use of Force Investigations) to define the term member and clarify that civilian use of force will be investigated in accordance with MPD policy.

Once the General Orders have been approved a final report will be forwarded to you with a copy of the new policy.

If there are any questions, please feel free to contact me on 202-727-4218.

Sincerely,



Cathy L. Lahier
Chief of Police

(IQ#4100048)

APPENDIX 3

APPENDICES



**Metropolitan Police
Department**

Incident-Based Event Report

Washington, D.C.

PART I - CLASSIFICATION OF EVENT																																														
1 TYPE OF REPORT	2 DATE AND TIME OF EVENT								3 DATE OF REPORT				5 6 7 8 SECTOR BEAT COMPLAINT NUMBER																																	
	Start Date			Start Time			End Date			End Time				REPORT		REPORT																														
	Month	Day	Year	Hour	Minute		Month	Day	Year	Hour	Minute			Month	Day	Year	Hour	Minute																												
<input type="radio"/> Offense <input type="radio"/> Incident FILL IN THE OVALS COMPLETELY Right Mark <input type="radio"/> Wrong Marks <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="radio"/> Jan	<input type="radio"/> Feb	<input type="radio"/> Mar	<input type="radio"/> Apr	<input type="radio"/> May	<input type="radio"/> Jun	<input type="radio"/> Jul	<input type="radio"/> Aug	<input type="radio"/> Sep	<input type="radio"/> Oct	<input type="radio"/> Nov	<input type="radio"/> Dec	<input type="radio"/> Jan	<input type="radio"/> Feb	<input type="radio"/> Mar	<input type="radio"/> Apr	<input type="radio"/> May	<input type="radio"/> Jun	<input type="radio"/> Jul	<input type="radio"/> Aug	<input type="radio"/> Sep	<input type="radio"/> Oct	<input type="radio"/> Nov	<input type="radio"/> Dec	<input type="radio"/> Jan	<input type="radio"/> Feb	<input type="radio"/> Mar	<input type="radio"/> Apr	<input type="radio"/> May	<input type="radio"/> Jun	<input type="radio"/> Jul	<input type="radio"/> Aug	<input type="radio"/> Sep	<input type="radio"/> Oct	<input type="radio"/> Nov	<input type="radio"/> Dec	<input type="radio"/> 0	<input type="radio"/> 1	<input type="radio"/> 2	<input type="radio"/> 3	<input type="radio"/> 4	<input type="radio"/> 5	<input type="radio"/> 6	<input type="radio"/> 7	<input type="radio"/> 8	<input type="radio"/> 9
	9 EVENT LOCATION ADDRESS													10 REPORT RECEIVED BY		11 IS RADIO RUN LOCATION AND EVENT LOCATION THE SAME?		12 PROPERTY TYPE																												
	13 EVENT NO. 1													14 EVENT NO. 2		15 EVENT NO. 3																														
	16 FORCED ENTRY		17 POINT OF ENTRY		18 a. Method Used			19 b. Tools Used			20 WEATHER CONDITIONS																																			
	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No										<input type="radio"/> Clear <input type="radio"/> Rain <input type="radio"/> Other <input type="radio"/> Cloudy <input type="radio"/> Snow <input type="radio"/> Not applicable																																			
	21 SUSPECTED HATE CRIME?				22 SECURITY SYSTEM (Mark all that apply)								23 DESIGNATED AREAS (Mark all that apply)																																	
	<input type="radio"/> None <input type="radio"/> Ethnic <input type="radio"/> Sexual Orientation <input type="radio"/> Racial <input type="radio"/> Religious <input type="radio"/> Other				<input type="radio"/> Alarm/Audio <input type="radio"/> Alarm/Silent <input type="radio"/> Camera <input type="radio"/> Dog <input type="radio"/> Dead bolt <input type="radio"/> Unlocked <input type="radio"/> Exterior lights <input type="radio"/> Interior lights <input type="radio"/> Fence <input type="radio"/> Guard <input type="radio"/> Neighborhood watch <input type="radio"/> Other <input type="radio"/> Not applicable <input type="radio"/> Unknown								<input type="radio"/> Victim's vehicle <input type="radio"/> Apartment/Condo unit <input type="radio"/> In public housing <input type="radio"/> Suspect's vehicle <input type="radio"/> Single family dwelling <input type="radio"/> Hotel/Motel room <input type="radio"/> Win 1 block of public housing <input type="radio"/> Taxi-cab <input type="radio"/> College/University dorm <input type="radio"/> Classroom <input type="radio"/> W/in 1,000 ft. of school <input type="radio"/> Bus <input type="radio"/> Train/Metro/Amtrak/Etc. <input type="radio"/> Office room <input type="radio"/> Other <input type="radio"/> Hallway <input type="radio"/> Elevator <input type="radio"/> Vacant building/room <input type="radio"/> Not applicable <input type="radio"/> Stairwell <input type="radio"/> Basement/Laundry room <input type="radio"/> Storage area <input type="radio"/> Customer area <input type="radio"/> Unknown																																	
	PART II - VICTIM INFORMATION																																													
	24 NAME OF COMPLAINANT/VICTIM/MISSING PERSON NO. 1					25 RELATED TO EVENT NO(S)		26 NAME OF COMPLAINANT/VICTIM/MISSING PERSON NO. 1					27 RELATED TO EVENT NO(S)																																	
						1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10							1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10																																	
	28 VICTIM TYPE																																													
	<input type="radio"/> Individual <input type="radio"/> Financial inst. <input type="radio"/> Religious org. <input type="radio"/> Police officer <input type="radio"/> Business <input type="radio"/> Government <input type="radio"/> Society/Public <input type="radio"/> Other																																													
29 DATE OF BIRTH			30 AGE		31 SEX		32 HOME PHONE																																							
Month Day Year			RANGE		Male () Female () Un-known ()		()																																							
33 RACE/ETHNICITY (Mark all that apply)			34 BUSINESS PHONE																																											
<input type="radio"/> American Indian/Alaskan Native <input type="radio"/> Japanese <input type="radio"/> Asian/Pacific Islander <input type="radio"/> Korean <input type="radio"/> Black <input type="radio"/> Vietnamese <input type="radio"/> Chinese <input type="radio"/> White <input type="radio"/> Latino/Hispanic <input type="radio"/> Other <input type="radio"/> Jamaican <input type="radio"/> Unknown/Refused																																														
35 HOME ADDRESS					36 HOME ADDRESS																																									
<input type="radio"/> DC Resident <input type="radio"/> Non-DC Resident <input type="radio"/> Unknown					<input type="radio"/> DC Resident <input type="radio"/> Non-DC Resident <input type="radio"/> Unknown																																									
37 BUSINESS ADDRESS/SCHOOL																																														
38 BUSINESS ADDRESS/SCHOOL																																														
39 OCCUPATION					40 OCCUPATION																																									
41 IS EVENT RELATED TO OCCUPATION?					42 IS EVENT RELATED TO OCCUPATION?																																									
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Unknown					<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Unknown																																									
43 ADDITIONAL MEANS TO CONTACT COMPLAINANT/VICTIM NO. 1																																														
44 ADDITIONAL MEANS TO CONTACT COMPLAINANT/VICTIM NO. 1																																														
45 STATUS					46 REVIEWER				47 DISTRIBUTION																																					
<input type="radio"/> Open <input type="radio"/> Closed <input type="radio"/> Closed by arrest, attach PD-252 <input type="radio"/> (Mark one) <input type="radio"/> Unfounded <input type="radio"/> Suspended																																														

APPENDICES

PART V - MISSING PERSONS						
64 PROBABLE CAUSE OF ABSENCE AND DESTINATION					65	COMPLAINT NUMBER
66 IF MISSING PERSON HAS RUN AWAY BEFORE, GIVE DATE AND WHERE LOCATED:					67	CLASSIFICATION
69 PHYSICAL/MENTAL CONDITION (i.e., diabetic)					70	DESCRIBE ARTICLES OF JEWELRY WORN AND IDENTIFICATION CARRIED
72 ADDRESS OF PARENT/GUARDIAN					73	IF JUVENILE, ENTER MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME
75 NARRATIVE Describe event and action taken. If additional narrative space is needed, use PD Form 251-A.					68	CLASSIFIED BY:
Item Number Continued					<input type="radio"/> Critical <input type="radio"/> Non-critical	
					0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9	
					74 MISSING PERSON SECTION NOTIFIED (Name)	
					76 EVIDENCE TECHNICIAN/CSES #	
					77 NAME OF INVESTIGATOR NOTIFIED	
					78 TELETYPE NOTIFIED (Name)	
					79 TELETYPE #	
					NOTIFICATION ALSO REQUIRED WHENEVER MISSING PERSON LOCATED	
80 REPORTING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE			ELEMENT	81 OTHER POLICE AGENCY		ELEMENT
82 SECOND OFFICER'S NAME			ELEMENT	83 SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR		ELEMENT
BADGE NUMBER 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 S 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 C			(Indicate if report prepared by officer other than MPD) <input type="radio"/> USCP <input type="radio"/> USSS <input type="radio"/> METRO TRANSIT <input type="radio"/> OTHER	BADGE NUMBER 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 S 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 C		BADGE NUMBER 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 S 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 C

APPENDICES

PART VI - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (Use PD Form 251-C for additional victims or suspects.)

<p>84 NAME OF COMPLAINANT/VICTIM/MISSING PERSON NO. 1 85 RELATED TO EVENT NO(S). <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 <input type="checkbox"/> 8 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 <input type="checkbox"/> 10</p> <p>86 VICTIM TYPE <input type="checkbox"/> Individual <input type="checkbox"/> Financial inst. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious org. <input type="checkbox"/> Police officer <input type="checkbox"/> Business <input type="checkbox"/> Government <input type="checkbox"/> Society/Public <input type="checkbox"/> Other</p> <p>87 DATE OF BIRTH 88 AGE 89 SEX 90 HOME PHONE <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> NA RANGE () Month Day Year <input type="checkbox"/> 0-1 yr. <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Jan () () () <input type="checkbox"/> 2-12 yrs. <input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/> Feb () () () <input type="checkbox"/> 13-17 yrs. <input type="checkbox"/> Un- <input type="checkbox"/> Mar () () () <input type="checkbox"/> 18-65 yrs. known 91 BUSINESS PHONE <input type="checkbox"/> Apr () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Over 65 () () <input type="checkbox"/> May () () () 92 RACE/ETHNICITY (Mark all that apply) <input type="checkbox"/> Jun () () () <input type="checkbox"/> American Indian/Alaskan Native <input type="checkbox"/> Japanese <input type="checkbox"/> Jul () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Asian/Pacific Islander <input type="checkbox"/> Korean <input type="checkbox"/> Aug () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Black <input type="checkbox"/> Vietnamese <input type="checkbox"/> Sep () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Chinese <input type="checkbox"/> White <input type="checkbox"/> Oct () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Latino/Hispanic <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Nov () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Jamaican <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown/Refused <input type="checkbox"/> Dec () () ()</p> <p>93 HOME ADDRESS <input type="checkbox"/> DC Resident <input type="checkbox"/> Non-DC Resident <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown</p> <p>94 BUSINESS ADDRESS/SCHOOL</p> <p>95 OCCUPATION 96 IS EVENT RELATED TO OCCUPATION? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown</p> <p>97 ADDITIONAL MEANS TO CONTACT COMPLAINANT/VICTIM NO. 1</p>	<p>98 NAME OF COMPLAINANT/VICTIM/MISSING PERSON NO. 1 99 RELATED TO EVENT NO(S). <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 <input type="checkbox"/> 8 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 <input type="checkbox"/> 10</p> <p>100 VICTIM TYPE <input type="checkbox"/> Individual <input type="checkbox"/> Financial inst. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious org. <input type="checkbox"/> Police officer <input type="checkbox"/> Business <input type="checkbox"/> Government <input type="checkbox"/> Society/Public <input type="checkbox"/> Other</p> <p>101 DATE OF BIRTH 102 AGE 103 SEX 104 HOME PHONE <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> NA RANGE () Month Day Year <input type="checkbox"/> 0-1 yr. <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Jan () () () <input type="checkbox"/> 2-12 yrs. <input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/> Feb () () () <input type="checkbox"/> 13-17 yrs. <input type="checkbox"/> Un- <input type="checkbox"/> Mar () () () <input type="checkbox"/> 18-65 yrs. known 105 BUSINESS PHONE <input type="checkbox"/> Apr () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Over 65 () () <input type="checkbox"/> May () () () 106 RACE/ETHNICITY (Mark all that apply) <input type="checkbox"/> Jun () () () <input type="checkbox"/> American Indian/Alaskan Native <input type="checkbox"/> Japanese <input type="checkbox"/> Jul () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Asian/Pacific Islander <input type="checkbox"/> Korean <input type="checkbox"/> Aug () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Black <input type="checkbox"/> Vietnamese <input type="checkbox"/> Sep () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Chinese <input type="checkbox"/> White <input type="checkbox"/> Oct () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Latino/Hispanic <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Nov () () () <input type="checkbox"/> Jamaican <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown/Refused <input type="checkbox"/> Dec () () ()</p> <p>107 HOME ADDRESS <input type="checkbox"/> DC Resident <input type="checkbox"/> Non-DC Resident <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown</p> <p>108 BUSINESS ADDRESS/SCHOOL</p> <p>109 OCCUPATION 110 IS EVENT RELATED TO OCCUPATION? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown</p> <p>111 ADDITIONAL MEANS TO CONTACT COMPLAINANT/VICTIM NO. 1</p>
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112	#1	a. Race <input type="checkbox"/> Asian <input type="checkbox"/> White <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> Black <input type="checkbox"/> Latino/Hispanic <input type="checkbox"/> Other	b. Sex <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> Female	c. Exact Age or Range	d. Height	e. Weight	f. Eyes	g. Hair	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Suspect <input type="checkbox"/> Missing								
	h. Complexion	i. Scars	j. Mustache	k. Facial Hair	l. Hat	m. Coat/Jacket	n. Pants	o. Blouse/Shirt	p. Perpetrator Suspected of Using <input type="checkbox"/> Alcohol <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Computer <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
	q. Weapons Used in Offense (Mark all that apply)								
	Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Handgun <input type="checkbox"/> Shotgun <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Revolver <input type="checkbox"/> Semi-automatic <input type="checkbox"/> firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Rifle <input type="checkbox"/> Automatic		Other <input type="checkbox"/> Cutting instrument <input type="checkbox"/> Hands/Feet/Teeth <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) <input type="checkbox"/> Blunt object <input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> Motor vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown		Color	Make	Model	Caliber	
113	#2	a. Race <input type="checkbox"/> Asian <input type="checkbox"/> White <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> Black <input type="checkbox"/> Latino/Hispanic <input type="checkbox"/> Other	b. Sex <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> Female	c. Exact Age or Range	d. Height	e. Weight	f. Eyes	g. Hair	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Suspect <input type="checkbox"/> Missing								
	h. Complexion	i. Scars	j. Mustache	k. Facial Hair	l. Hat	m. Coat/Jacket	n. Pants	o. Blouse/Shirt	p. Perpetrator Suspected of Using <input type="checkbox"/> Alcohol <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Computer <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
	q. Weapons Used in Offense (Mark all that apply)								
	Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Handgun <input type="checkbox"/> Shotgun <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Revolver <input type="checkbox"/> Semi-automatic <input type="checkbox"/> firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Rifle <input type="checkbox"/> Automatic		Other <input type="checkbox"/> Cutting instrument <input type="checkbox"/> Hands/Feet/Teeth <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) <input type="checkbox"/> Blunt object <input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> Motor vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown		Color	Make	Model	Caliber	
114	#3	a. Race <input type="checkbox"/> Asian <input type="checkbox"/> White <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> Black <input type="checkbox"/> Latino/Hispanic <input type="checkbox"/> Other	b. Sex <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> Female	c. Exact Age or Range	d. Height	e. Weight	f. Eyes	g. Hair	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Suspect <input type="checkbox"/> Missing								
	h. Complexion	i. Scars	j. Mustache	k. Facial Hair	l. Hat	m. Coat/Jacket	n. Pants	o. Blouse/Shirt	p. Perpetrator Suspected of Using <input type="checkbox"/> Alcohol <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Computer <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
	q. Weapons Used in Offense (Mark all that apply)								
	Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Handgun <input type="checkbox"/> Shotgun <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Revolver <input type="checkbox"/> Semi-automatic <input type="checkbox"/> firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Rifle <input type="checkbox"/> Automatic		Other <input type="checkbox"/> Cutting instrument <input type="checkbox"/> Hands/Feet/Teeth <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) <input type="checkbox"/> Blunt object <input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> Motor vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown		Color	Make	Model	Caliber	

APPENDICES

P.D. 252 Rev. 10/86

Metropolitan Police Department **SUPPLEMENT REPORT** Washington, D. C.

<input type="checkbox"/> Classification Change <input type="checkbox"/> Additional Information		1. DISTRICT	2. BEAT	3. RA	4. ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION			5. COMPLAINT NUMBER								
		6. DATE OF THIS REPORT			7. REPORTING ELEM.		8. CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT CHANGED TO:									
9. DATE AND TIME OF EVENT			10. DATE AND TIME OF ORIG. RPT.			11. EVENT LOCATION			12. PROPERTY TYPE <input type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC <input type="checkbox"/> PRIVATE							
13. RADIO RUN RECEIVED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		14. DESCRIBE LOCATION			15. WHERE ENTERED		16. TOOLS/WEAPONS		17. METHODS							
18. COMPLAINANT/MISSING PERSON/FIRM				SEX	RACE	DATE OF BIRTH		COMPLAINANT/MISSING PERSON/FIRM				SEX	RACE	DATE OF BIRTH		
Suspect/ Missing Person	<input type="checkbox"/> SUSPECT		RACE	SEX	AGE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR	COMPLEXION	SCARS	HAT	COAT	JACKET	PANTS	SHIRT
	<input type="checkbox"/> MISSING PERSON		RACE	SEX	AGE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR	COMPLEXION	SCARS	HAT	COAT	JACKET	PANTS	SHIRT
	<input type="checkbox"/> SUSPECT		RACE	SEX	AGE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR	COMPLEXION	SCARS	HAT	COAT	JACKET	PANTS	SHIRT
	<input type="checkbox"/> MISSING PERSON		RACE	SEX	AGE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR	COMPLEXION	SCARS	HAT	COAT	JACKET	PANTS	SHIRT
20. SOLVABILITY FACTORS												Complete each item below. If additional space is needed, use the narrative section. If necessary, use PD Form 251-A. Refer to the specific item numbers when continuing information in the narrative section or on PD Form 251-A.				
A	IS THERE A WITNESS?		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		If yes, enter name(s), address(es), phone number(s), hours of availability and brief account.											
	B	IS A SUSPECT NAMED?		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO												
C		IS THE STOLEN PROPERTY TRACEABLE?		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		Include reason why or why not.										
	D	IS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE PRESENT?		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO												
E		IS THE PERPETRATOR KNOWN TO THE VICTIM?		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		Describe it.										
	F	WAS A REFERRAL FORM GIVEN TO COMPLAINANT?		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO												
G		DURING WHAT HOURS IS COMPLAINANT AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		If yes, describe the relationship.										
	H	DURING WHAT HOURS IS COMPLAINANT AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO												
I		DURING WHAT HOURS IS COMPLAINANT AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		Give any address, place of employment, or hangout known for the perpetrator(s).										
	J	DURING WHAT HOURS IS COMPLAINANT AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO												
DURING WHAT HOURS IS COMPLAINANT AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		List the name, address, phone number and any information provided when the area was canvassed.												
DURING WHAT HOURS IS COMPLAINANT AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO														
DURING WHAT HOURS IS COMPLAINANT AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		Describe MO or PATTERN												
DURING WHAT HOURS IS COMPLAINANT AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO														
21. ADDITIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY												Property Book				
CODE	ITEM			SERIAL NO./OPERATION ID NO.			MODEL NO.	COMP. VALUE	AGE	MPDC VALUE						
											BOOK/PAGE NO.					
											ADDITIONAL VALUE					
											ORIGINAL VALUE					
YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	COLOR	BODY	TAG/STATE/YEAR	VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NO.			* * *	TOTAL PROP. VALUE						
22. NARRATIVE: Record your activity and all developments in the case subsequent to your last report. List the names, addresses, sex, race, age, and arrest numbers of all arrested persons. Explain any change in classification. List the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all witnesses and suspects.																
23. STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> PRIOR CLOSED <input type="checkbox"/> CLOSED <input type="checkbox"/> UNFOUNDED (EXPLAIN IN NO. 22) <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPENDED (EXPLAIN IN NO. 22)					24. TELETYPE NO.		25. SOLVABILITY RATING		26. SOLVABILITY CLASSIFICA.							
27. INVESTIGATIVE OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPEND <input type="checkbox"/> INVESTIGATE FURTHER							28. SUPERVISOR'S RECOMMENDATION <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPEND <input type="checkbox"/> INVESTIGATE FURTHER									
29. REPORTING MEMBER'S SIGNATURE				BADGE/ELEM.		30. INVESTIGATOR'S SIGNATURE				BADGE/ELEM.		31. SUPERVISOR'S SIGNATURE			BADGE/ELEM.	
32. INVESTIGATIVE REVIEW OFFICER					33. SUPERVISOR			BADGE/ELEM.		34. REVIEWER		35. DISTRIBUTION				

* * * Value of vehicles will be entered by the Information Processing Section, Data Processing Division.

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