

**GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**  
**Office of the Inspector General**

Inspector General



April 21, 2010

The Honorable Adrian M. Fenty  
Mayor  
District of Columbia  
Mayor's Correspondence Unit, Suite 316  
1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20004


Dear Mayor Fenty:

Enclosed please find a copy of a Management Alert Report (MAR 10-I-001) issued January 21, 2010, to the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). The MAR addresses our finding that, due to the absence of adequate procedures, MPD officers assigned to the Juvenile Processing Center (JPC), which is housed in the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services' Youth Services Center, are unable to ensure that firearms (i.e., service weapons) brought into the facility by MPD and other law enforcement officers are properly accounted for and secured. Furthermore, JPC detainees are escorted in close proximity to the lock boxes currently used for storing firearms, a practice that could pose safety risks. The OIG also concluded that MPD's general order pertaining to service weapons lacks explicit, detailed guidance and instructions that an officer and members of his/her command structure should follow in the event that his/her service weapon is lost or stolen. MPD responses dated February 17, 2010, and March 31, 2010, are also enclosed.

Although the OIG is conducting an ongoing special evaluation of MPD's Youth Investigations Division for which a report will be completed later this year, we are providing this information to you now so that you are aware of the importance of the issues addressed in the MAR and the corrective actions proposed by MPD.

If you have questions, please contact Alvin Wright, Jr., Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Evaluations, at (202) 727-8452.

Sincerely,

  
Charles J. Willoughby  
Inspector General

CJW/eps

Enclosures

cc: See distribution list

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Mr. Neil O. Albert, City Administrator and Deputy Mayor, District of Columbia (1 copy)  
Ms. Valerie Santos, Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development, District of Columbia (1 copy)  
The Honorable Vincent C. Gray, Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia (1 copy)  
The Honorable Mary M. Cheh, Chairperson, Committee on Government Operations and the Environment, Council of the District of Columbia (1 copy)  
The Honorable Phil Mendelson, Chairperson, Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary, Council of the District of Columbia (1 copy)  
Mr. Andrew T. Richardson, III, General Counsel to the Mayor (1 copy)  
Ms. Carrie Kohns, Chief of Staff, Office of the Mayor (1 copy)  
Ms. Bridget Davis, Director, Office of Policy and Legislative Affairs (1 copy)  
Ms. Mafara Hobson, Director, Office of Communications (1 copy)  
Ms. Merav Bushlin, Chief of Budget Development and Execution, Office of the City Administrator (1 copy)  
Ms. Cynthia Brock-Smith, Secretary to the Council (13 copies)  
Mr. Peter Nickles, Attorney General for the District of Columbia (1 copy)  
Dr. Natwar M. Gandhi, Chief Financial Officer (4 copies)  
Mr. William DiVello, Executive Director, Office of Integrity and Oversight, Office of the Chief Financial Officer (1 copy)  
Ms. Deborah K. Nichols, D.C. Auditor (1 copy)  
Ms. Kelly Valentine, Director and Chief Risk Officer, Office of Risk Management (1 copy)  
Ms. Cathy L. Lanier, Chief, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (1 copy)  
Mr. Marc A. Schindler, Interim Director, Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (1 copy)  
Ms. Jeanette M. Franzel, Managing Director, FMA, GAO, Attention: Sandra Silzer (1 copy via email)  
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, D.C. Delegate, House of Representatives, Attention: Bradley Truding (1 copy)  
The Honorable Edolphus Towns, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Attention: Ron Stroman (1 copy)  
The Honorable Darrell Issa, Ranking Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (1 copy)  
The Honorable Stephen F. Lynch, Chairman, House Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia, Attention: William Miles (1 copy)  
The Honorable Jason Chaffetz, Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia (1 copy)  
The Honorable Joseph Lieberman, Chairman, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Attention: Holly Idelson (1 copy)  
The Honorable Susan Collins, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (1 copy)  
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia (1 copy)  
The Honorable George Voinovich, Ranking Member, Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia (1 copy)  
The Honorable David Obey, Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations, Attention: Beverly Pheto (1 copy)

Letter to Mayor Fenty  
April 21, 2010  
Page 3 of 3

The Honorable Jerry Lewis, Ranking Member, House Committee on Appropriations (1 copy)

The Honorable José E. Serrano, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Financial Services and  
General Government, Attention: Dale Oak (1 copy)

The Honorable Jo Ann Emerson, Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Financial Services  
and General Government (1 copy)

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations,  
Attention: Charles Houy (1 copy)

The Honorable Thad Cochran, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations (1 copy)

The Honorable Richard Durbin, Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Financial Services and  
General Government (1 copy)

The Honorable Susan Collins, Ranking Member, Senate Subcommittee on Financial Services  
and General Government (1 copy)



**DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**  
**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
**CHARLES J. WILLOUGHBY**  
**INSPECTOR GENERAL**

---

**INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATIONS DIVISION**  
***MANAGEMENT ALERT REPORT***

**D.C. METROPOLITAN POLICE**  
**DEPARTMENT:**  
**YOUTH INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

- **SERVICE WEAPONS POORLY SECURED AT THE JUVENILE PROCESSING CENTER**
- **INADEQUATE POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING AND INVESTIGATING MISSING WEAPONS**

**MAR 10-I-001**

**JANUARY 21, 2010**

---

**Inspections and Evaluations Division**  
**Mission Statement**

The Inspections and Evaluations (I&E) Division of the Office of the Inspector General is dedicated to providing District of Columbia (D.C.) government decision makers with objective, thorough, and timely evaluations and recommendations that will assist them in achieving efficiency, effectiveness, and economy in operations and programs. I&E goals are to help ensure compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies, to identify accountability, recognize excellence, and promote continuous improvement in the delivery of services to D.C. residents and others who have a vested interest in the success of the city.

**GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**  
**Office of the Inspector General**

Inspector General



January 21, 2010

Cathy L. Lanier  
Chief of Police  
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department  
300 Indiana Avenue N.W., Room 5080  
Washington, D.C. 20001

Dear Chief Lanier:

This is a Management Alert Report (MAR 10-I-001) to inform you that during our special evaluation of the Metropolitan Police Department's Youth Investigations Division (MPD/YID), the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) determined that, due to the absence of adequate procedures, MPD officers assigned to the Juvenile Processing Center (JPC) are unable to ensure that firearms (i.e., service weapons) brought into the facility by MPD and other law enforcement officers are properly accounted for and secured. Furthermore, JPC detainees are escorted in close proximity to the lock boxes currently used for storing firearms, a practice that could pose safety risks. The OIG also concluded that MPD's general order pertaining to service weapons lacks explicit, detailed guidance and instructions that an officer and members of his/her command structure should follow in the event that his/her service weapon is lost or stolen. The OIG provides these reports when it believes a matter requires the immediate attention of District government officials.

### **Background**

MPD officers assigned to the JPC are responsible for processing (i.e., booking on charges, photographing, fingerprinting, searching for contraband, etc.) juveniles arrested in the District of Columbia. The JPC is part of the MPD's YID and is housed in the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services' (DYRS) Youth Services Center (YSC), which is located at 1000 Mt. Olivet Rd., N.E. MPD officers, DYRS staff, and officers from other area police departments (such as the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority), transport juvenile detainees in and out of the DYRS building via a van port, which is a secure, garage-like space in the YSC building. Before entering the JPC, officers must secure their firearms in lock boxes<sup>1</sup> that are affixed to a wall of the van port and adjacent to a door that leads into the JPC and DYRS areas. DYRS control room employees remotely open facility doors, including those for the van port, and monitor video feeds for these doors from security cameras. The van port has a vehicle entry

---

<sup>1</sup> The lock boxes at the JPC are small metal lockers opened with keys that are used by law enforcement officers to secure their weapons. The lock boxes are secured to the wall (see photograph at Attachment 1). According to MPD Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Holding Facilities, effective May 30, 2003, an MPD member transporting a prisoner shall "[s]ecure his/her service weapon in a compartment specifically designated for securing weapons, PRIOR TO entering the cell block/holding area[.]" (Emphasis in the original.)

door, a vehicle exit door, and two pedestrian doors, all of which open to a parking lot area that is not fenced in.

## Observations

1. **Due to an insufficient number of functional lock boxes, law enforcement officers entering the JPC were sharing lock boxes. Explicit procedures regarding key control have not been established.**

In September and early November 2009, MPD interviewees stated that there were not enough keys for the JPC lock boxes, leading officers to sometimes place multiple firearms in one lock box. According to one senior MPD interviewee, a lack of keys for some lock boxes has been a problem throughout the MPD for 25 years. In addition, some keys to older JPC lock boxes open more than one lock box. In November 2009, an MPD interviewee stated that for at least a year, YID managers have been aware that keys for some lock boxes had disappeared and that new keys were needed.

When the OIG observed the lock boxes in the van port on November 13, 2009, 2 workers were completing installation of 10 additional lock boxes at the JPC (Attachment 1). One of the workers stated that eight of the newly installed lock boxes had keys and two did not. On December 2, 2009, the OIG observed that the van port had a total of 35 lock boxes. A YID manager stated that nine are obsolete and cannot be rekeyed; however, the OIG observed a JPC officer using one of these. The manager stated that six others are not MPD property but can be used when a JPC officer accesses them with a key, although another manager stated that these lock boxes are not in use. Of the remaining 20 lock boxes, 7 lock boxes each had a key present in them, 3 lock boxes were in use by 3 officers to store their firearms, and 1 was inoperable. A YID manager stated that the keys for 9 of the 20 remaining lock boxes had been lost. Interviewees stated that some JPC officers have lock box keys that they keep with them, including when the officers are not at the JPC. After installation of the new lock boxes, a YID manager stated that some of the JPC lock boxes should be rekeyed.

Although the number of functional lock boxes has increased, the JPC lacks adequate procedures to ensure accountability for lock box keys and security of the weapons stored in them. According to one YID manager and OIG observations, keys are stored in the keyholes of the empty lock boxes. Another YID manager stated that most lock box locations throughout the MPD have too few lock boxes with keys because officers “walk off” with the keys. This manager added that the JPC does not maintain a log showing which officer has which lock box key, but YID is considering methods to improve control over the keys. Another YID manager stated that there were no written procedures for securing weapons or using the lock boxes at the JPC, but acknowledged that officers are required to secure their weapons before processing detainees.

The JPC’s lock box practices contrast sharply with the controls maintained by the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. In November 2009, the OIG observed USMS procedures for securing service weapons carried by non-USMS law enforcement officers entering the court. The lock boxes are maintained in a separate room

behind a desk staffed by an USMS Court Security Officer. The lock boxes and the keys are numbered, only one key opens each box, and only one officer may use a box. The Court Security Officer provides keys to officers, collects the keys from the officers, and maintains a log with each officer's name and the key number of the box he/she is using.

The OIG is also concerned that the location of the JPC lock boxes in the van port may not be the most secure location to ensure service weapons are not stolen. Officers lead juvenile detainees, albeit handcuffed, through the van port in close proximity to the lock boxes (Attachment 2). The OIG believes that because the lock boxes are in an area through which detainees pass, there may be a risk of detainees obtaining weapons. According to a YID manager, the van port is not continuously monitored by MPD personnel. This manager opined that lock boxes for weapons stored in MPD stations are more secure because, unlike at the JPC, they are located near MPD employees.

Interviews and observations by the OIG indicate that one of the JPC van port doors does not always close promptly, which could enable unauthorized access to the van port and lock boxes. A DYRS manager explained to the OIG that a van port vehicle door is on a timer that delays its closing for 30 to 60 seconds after a DYRS control room employee pushes a button to close it. When the DYRS control room is busy, DYRS control room personnel may have to respond to other requests and may not wait to ensure that the van port door closed. The van port is equipped with cameras that send video feeds to the DYRS control room, but control room personnel usually monitor areas only when they receive a request to open a door. A YID manager stated that he/she witnessed an incident during which the wrong doors were opened and a juvenile ran into the van port and was subsequently apprehended.

**2. MPD does not have explicit policies and procedures for reporting and locating missing service weapons.**

MPD General Order GO-RAR-901.01 Handling of Service Weapons, effective June 12, 2008, states, "Supervisors shall be responsible for conducting investigations of stolen, lost, or damaged firearms (including shotguns) and ensuring that a PD Form 43 (Report of Damage to or Loss of DC Government Property) is prepared in the case of stolen, lost, or damaged firearms/ammunition."

The OIG learned that a JPC officer discovered on November 10, 2009, that his/her firearm was missing from a JPC lock box. Interviewees stated that they assumed another MPD officer mistakenly took it because an MPD firearm was left in another lock box. An MPD interviewee speculated that a key that opened more than one lock box allowed an officer to take the wrong firearm. A YID manager stated that the two firearms were returned to the correct officers 2 days after the incident occurred. This manager opined that the YID watch commander should have been notified immediately, which would have led to a more rapid resolution. Except for a YID sergeant who was notified the day after the firearm was missing, it appears that no YID officials were notified of the missing firearm prior to the OIG's inquiries about it. According to a YID manager, once YID managers were aware of the incident, they contacted MPD Communications to trace the serial number on the firearm left at the JPC to determine to whom it was registered

and contacted this officer. This manager stated he/she had not been notified of other incidents of firearms missing from the JPC.

According to a YID manager, an administrative investigation regarding the JPC incident is ongoing. The OIG asked whether any documentation had been completed regarding the missing weapon. The manager responded that no report needed to be filed because the weapon was not considered missing or stolen; rather, an officer accidentally took the wrong weapon. However, the OIG notes that from November 10 to November 12, 2009, YID did not know the location of the firearm or who possessed it, and an investigation had not been completed.

A senior MPD interviewee stated that there have been mix-ups with officers' weapons in multiple MPD Districts where he/she has worked. The OIG contacted an official with the MPD Armorer's Office to request information on the number of incidents in which replacement weapons have been issued due to officers inadvertently exchanging firearms. This official stated that the Armorer's Office does not receive requests for replacements in these circumstances. Rather, the office provides replacement weapons when a weapon is lost, stolen, or involved in a shooting. This official added that the Armorer's Office is not usually contacted when an officer takes the wrong firearm because the officers can usually determine who has the firearm in question. The official stated that he recalled only two incidents in the past year of lost or stolen MPD firearms.

The OIG is concerned that the security deficiencies cited create a risk that law enforcement firearms will be stolen and used to commit crimes. In addition to putting the safety of District residents at risk, this could increase the District's legal liability.

The OIG reviewed the procedure for reporting lost, damaged, or stolen firearms contained in MPD General Order GO--RAR--901.01 entitled "Handling of Service Weapons." It does not specify: 1) who in the chain of command should be notified of a missing or stolen weapon and when they should be notified; 2) when supervisors should complete investigations and written reports of missing or stolen weapons; and 3) what steps members in the MPD chain of command should take to locate lost or stolen service weapons. In addition, this general order does not state whether the provisions for lost or stolen service weapons apply to incidents in which officers are presumed to have inadvertently exchanged weapons or include provisions for such instances.

## **Recommendations**

Due to the safety issues associated with the above conditions, the OIG recommends placing a high priority on the following actions:

1. That the Chief of Police (a) ensure that the JPC develop and implement explicit written procedures to ensure accountability for weapons stored in lock boxes, including control of keys, and (b) develop detailed written procedures for reporting and investigating missing service weapons, including those presumed to be inadvertently exchanged between officers, and communicate them to all MPD members.

2. That the Chief of Police evaluate the security of the JPC lock box location and, if deemed necessary, work with DYRS to move them promptly to a more secure location.
3. With regard to references made by an interviewee to problems with lock boxes and weapons mix-ups throughout the MPD, the OIG did not conduct direct observations of this issue at other MPD locations or review incident reports. However, we recommend that the Chief of Police evaluate the availability of lock boxes with keys and procedures used to secure service weapons at other MPD locations and, if necessary, take corrective action to ensure security and safety.
4. That the MPD work with DYRS to implement a system to ensure that the van port door closes more promptly.

Please provide your comments on this MAR by February 5, 2010. Your response should include actions taken or planned, dates for completion of planned actions, and reasons for any disagreements with the concerns and recommendations presented. Please distribute this MAR only to those who will be directly involved in preparing your response.

Should you have any questions prior to preparing your response, please contact [REDACTED], Director of Planning and Inspections, at 202-[REDACTED].

Sincerely,

  
Charles J. Willoughby  
Inspector General

CJW/klb

cc: Mr. Neil O. Albert, City Administrator and Deputy Mayor  
The Honorable Vincent C. Gray, Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia  
The Honorable Mary M. Cheh, Chairperson, Committee on Government Operations and the Environment  
The Honorable Phil Mendelson, Chairperson, Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary  
Mr. Marc A. Schindler, Interim Director, Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services

**Attachment 1: JPC Lock Boxes, Including 10 Installed on November 13, 2009**

On December 2, 2009, the OIG observed these 20 beige lock boxes; of which, 7 had keys present; 3 MPD members at the JPC had keys to 3 lock boxes being used to store their firearms; 1 was inoperable; and a YID manager stated that the remaining 9 keys had been lost.



**Attachment 2: Van Port with Lock Boxes**

From left to right: beige, white, and black lock boxes attached to wall; sally port into building; door to outside the building; and vehicle entrance door.





**Government of the  
District of Columbia**

**Office of the Inspector General**

*Report Fraud, Waste,  
Abuse, or Mismanagement to:*

**Charles J. Willoughby  
Inspector General**

**Toll Free Hotline:**

**1-800-521-1639  
or 202-724-TIPS (724-8477)  
or [hotline.oig@dc.gov](mailto:hotline.oig@dc.gov)**

**All calls are Confidential.**

**Address:**


**Office of the Inspector General  
717 14th Street, NW  
Suite 500  
Washington, D.C. 20005**

**Web Page: [www.oig.dc.gov](http://www.oig.dc.gov)**

---



GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT



2010 FEB 22 PM 3: 59

FEB 17 2010

Charles Willoughby  
Inspector General  
Office of the Inspector General  
717 14<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Inspector Willoughby:

I am in receipt of the Management Alert Report (MAR 10-I-001) wherein your office conducted a special evaluation of the Metropolitan Police Department's Youth Investigations Division's Juvenile Processing Center (YID/JPC). The report identified the following procedural deficient areas within the processing center that needed to be addressed by this agency:

- (1) Security of firearms brought into the facility by law enforcement personnel.
- (2) Detainees escorted within close proximity to the weapons lock boxes currently being utilized for storing firearms.
- (3) MPD's general order pertaining to service weapons lacks explicit, detailed guidance and instructions that an officer and members of his/her command structure should follow in the event that his/her service weapon is lost or stolen.
- (4) The van port vehicle door is on a timer that delays its closing for 30 to 60 seconds after a Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) control room employee pushes a button to close it.

These issues have been addressed and the actions taken on each are listed below.

**(A) Security of firearms brought into the facility by law enforcement personnel**

MPDC Standard Operating Procedures governing Holding Facilities [supplemented in GO-PCA-502.01 (Transporting Prisoners)] addresses the issue of security of weapons in prisoner holding facilities.

Part III, B, 2, a, (2) states in part: "The transporting member shall: a: prior to entering the cell block/holding area:...(2) Secure his/her service weapon in a compartment specifically designed for securing such weapons. PRIOR TO entering the cell block/holding area; (CALEA 72.4.1)"

This is in conformance with the policies of the DYRS which does not allow weapons to be brought into the facility and as such firearms are stored in locked gun boxes within the van port. MPD members are required to secure their service weapons prior to taking any prisoners out of their transport vehicles, and once the weapons are secured, to then remove the prisoner from the vehicle for transfer to the YID/JPC. When transferring prisoners from the YID/JPC to their transport vehicles, officers are required to first secure the prisoners inside of the vehicle and after the prisoner is secured, retrieve their weapons from the gun boxes at the JPC.

A directive is being put out to all members of the department reemphasizing the above listed procedures.

**(B) Detainees escorted within close proximity to the weapons lock boxes currently being utilized for storing firearms.**

The YID/JPC is a component of the Youth Services Center facility, which is under the purview of the DYRS and any changes to the facility or to the policies governing this facility require their approval. The DYRS has agreed to remove the older gun lock boxes and after the MPD acquires them, to reinstall new gun lock boxes inside of the van port.

The detainees that are transported to the YID/JPC are brought into the facility, restrained and escorted by law enforcement personnel. Detainees are handcuffed with their hands behind their back. They are only in the area where the locked secured gun boxes are located for a sufficient amount of time that is consistent with entering and leaving transport vehicles and the YID/JPC.

Additionally, the policy of the DYRS is that no weapons are allowed inside of their facilities to include the YID/JPC. Again, although JPC is housed there, this portion of the facility falls under their immediate purview.

**(C) MPD's general order pertaining to service weapons lacks explicit, detailed guidance and instructions that an officer and members of his/her command structure should follow in the event that his/her service weapon is lost or stolen.**

MPD General Order GO-PER-110.11 (Uniforms and Equipment) Part IV, A, 16, a, states in part "All incidents of loss of property, or incidents resulting in irreparable damage to items of District Government property or issued Department property, shall be reported on the PD Form 43 as soon as possible, but (Report of Damage TO or Loss of Government Property) within 24 hours."

The requirements for reporting loss or damage to equipment, to include service weapons is further delineated in Part IV, A, 16, d, which states in part, "Member reporting the loss of identifiable Department property (items marked with identifying numbers, e.g., badge, pistol, identification card, etc.) or reporting the loss of property as a result of a criminal offense, shall in addition to the PD Form 43, prepare a PD Form 251 (Event Report).

Departmental members are provided copies of the departmental General Orders, receive in service training, and have access to the MPD website that contains all departmental directives. Members receive this training while in the police academy and during in service training while at the various districts.

**(D)The van port vehicle door is on a timer that delays its closing for 30 to 60 seconds after a DYRS control room employee pushes a button to close it.**

The YID/JPS staff met with the DYRS staff reference to this issue. As stated in the report, the door is manually operated by the DYRS employee. However, the door is not on a timer as stated, but rather opens and closes when that employee presses a button to operate it. Both staffs have been working to identify and initiate procedures, that will eliminate any lag time that may occur during the opening and closing of the van port doors. The work to resolve this issue is ongoing.

Additionally, the audit indicated that the many of older JPC gun lock boxes can be opened utilizing the same key. The report also indicated that several of the gun lock boxes needed to be replaced and/or rekeyed.

The YID/JPC staff is continuing to work with the MPD and DYRS Facility staffs to obtain additional gun lock boxes. The boxes have been ordered and upon arrival and installation, the accompanying keys for each individual box will be numbered and the YID/YPC staff will utilize a log book system in order to maintain command and control of the keys to each box. Estimated date for the arrival for the gun boxes and installation is February 24, 2010.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Cathy L. Lahier". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Cathy L. Lahier  
Chief of Police



GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

MAR 31 2010

Charles J. Willoughby  
Inspector General  
Office of the Inspector General  
717 14<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Willoughby:

**Re: OIG MAR-10-I-001**

This letter is in reference to your correspondence dated March 16, 2010, wherein you requested supplemental information pertaining to the February 17, 2010, response to recommendations made regarding the Office of the Inspector General's Management Alert Report entitled *Service Weapons Poorly Secured at the Juvenile Processing Center; Inadequate Policy and Procedures for Reporting and Investigating Missing Weapons*.

In regard to your request for supplemental information as to the following recommendations:

**OIG Recommendation 1(a):** That the Chief of Police ensure that the JPC [Juvenile Processing Center] develop and implement explicit written procedures to ensure accountability for weapons stored in lock boxes, including the control of keys.

To provide for site specific instructions for securing service weapons at the Juvenile Processing Center, on February 18, 2010, Teletype number 02-047-10 was issued to the Department which reinforced that service weapons are not allowed inside the Juvenile Processing Facility. This teletype message detailed that service weapons are to be stored in locked gun boxes within the van port area prior to handling a prisoner, and only when the prisoner is secured either inside of the processing center or transport vehicle members are to retrieve their service weapon from the lock box. The Commander of Youth Investigations Division has been directed to review the current policy and compliance in regard to the storage of service weapons at the Juvenile Processing Center and to make recommendations pertaining to any needed revisions that may improve officer safety and the secure storage of service weapons.

The usage of the log book to record the issuance of keys for the lock box has been found to be impractical; manpower could not be dedicated to maintaining a log book within the van port to track the issuance of keys to the lock boxes and maintaining a log book within the facility is not viable as service weapons cannot be brought into the Juvenile Processing Center.

**OIG Recommendation 1(b):** That the Chief of Police develop detailed written procedures for reporting and investigating missing service weapons, including those presumed to be inadvertently exchanged between officers, and communicate them to all MPD members.

The Department currently has specified procedures for the investigation of lost and/or stolen articles of uniform and equipment, to include service weapons. In addition to the requirements referenced under General Order 110.11, *Uniforms and Equipment*, General Order 201.26, *Duties, Responsibilities, and Conduct of Members of the Department* requires all members to bring to the attention of an official any matters of police interest occurring within their tour of duty. The official notified would be responsible for initiating an investigation into the circumstances of the loss of the weapon within one hour of notification by obtaining an Incident Summary number from Internal Affairs Division. Per General Order 901.01, *Handling of Service Weapons*, supervisors are responsible for preparing an investigative report for all stolen, lost, or damaged firearms. This chain of command investigation is due within twenty days and will detail the circumstances of the loss and all actions taken to recover the weapon.

In any instance where an official is notified that it is presumed members have inadvertently exchanged service weapons, the official would be responsible for ensuring that each member involved is immediately notified of the discrepancy and the official will immediately facilitate the return of the issued weapon to the effected members. This accountability is outlined in General Order 101.09, *Duties and Responsibilities of Sworn Officials*.

In regard to the missing service weapon referenced in MAR-10-I-001, once the matter was brought to the attention of the Youth Investigations Division command staff an investigation was initiated, and the weapons were returned to the assigned members within two hours. The investigation revealed that both the officer reporting the loss and the supervisor notified of the loss failed to adhere to Departmental policy in regard to the reporting of the lost weapon, and both members received discipline for their derelictions.


**OIG Recommendation 3:** With regard to references made by an interviewee to problems with lock boxes and weapons mix-ups throughout the MPD, the OIG did not conduct direct observations of this issue at other MPD locations or review incident reports. However, we recommend that the Chief of Police evaluate the availability of lock boxes with keys and procedures used to secure service weapons at other MPD locations and, if necessary, take corrective action to ensure security and safety.

In response to this recommendation, all facilities with lock boxes were evaluated to determine the availability and condition of the lock boxes. The evaluation revealed that there are currently unusable lock boxes at five facilities, with all attributed to the loss of keys to the lock boxes.

To repair and make all lock boxes fully operational, replacement lock boxes and replacement parts will be ordered, to include replacement keys. To reduce the likelihood of lost keys, large tags will be added to the existing and replacement keys.

If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Cathy L. Lanier". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "C".

Cathy L. Lanier  
Chief of Police